Automated Construction of Bounded-Loss Imperfect-Recall Abstractions in
  Extensive-Form Games by Cermak, Jiri et al.
Constructing Imperfect Recall Abstractions to Solve
Large Extensive-Form Games
Jiˇr´ı Cˇerma´k, Viliam Lisy´∗, Branislav Bosˇansky´
Artificial Intelligence Center, Department of Computer Science, Czech Technical University
in Prague
Abstract
Extensive-form games are an important model of finite sequential interaction
between players. The size of the extensive-form representation is, however,
often prohibitive and it is the most common cause preventing deployment of
game-theoretic solution concepts to real-world scenarios. The state-of-the-art
approach to solve this issue is the information abstraction methodology. The in-
formation abstraction reduces the size of the original large extensive-form game
by removing information available to players; hence merging the information
sets which from their decision points. Since the players have to play identical
strategy in the merged information sets, the size of the strategy representation in
the abstracted game can be significantly smaller than in the original game. The
abstracted game is then solved, and the small resulting strategies are used in
the original game. The majority of existing information abstraction approaches
create abstracted games where players remember all their actions and all the
information they obtained in the abstracted game – a property denoted as a
perfect recall. Remembering all the actions, however, causes the number of
decision points of the player (and hence also the size of his strategy) to grow
exponentially with the number of actions taken in the past. On the other hand,
relaxing the perfect recall requirement (resulting in so-called imperfect recall
abstractions) can significantly increase the computational complexity of solving
the resulting abstracted game. Hence, there is only a limited amount of work
that focuses on using imperfect recall abstractions. These approaches either use
computationally complex algorithms to solve the abstracted game or restrict to
trivial subclasses of imperfect recall abstractions that are easy to solve. In this
work, we take a novel approach to imperfect recall information abstractions,
which does not require any specific structure of the imperfect recall abstracted
game nor does it use computationally complex algorithms to solve it. Instead,
we introduce two domain-independent algorithms FPIRA and CFR+IRA which
are able to start with an arbitrary imperfect recall abstraction of the solved
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two-player zero-sum perfect recall extensive-form game. The algorithms simul-
taneously solve the abstracted game, detect the missing information causing
problems and return it to the players. This process is repeated until provable
convergence to the desired approximation of the Nash equilibrium of the origi-
nal game. We experimentally demonstrate that even when the algorithms start
with trivial coarse imperfect recall abstraction, they are capable of approximat-
ing Nash equilibrium of large extensive-form games using abstraction with as
little as 0.9% of information sets of the original game. Moreover, the results
suggest that the relative memory requirements of the algorithms will further
decrease as the size of the solved game increases.
Keywords: Extensive-Form Games, Information Abstraction, Imperfect
Recall, Nash Equilibrium, Fictitious Play, Counterfactual Regret Minimization
1. Introduction
Dynamic games with a finite number of moves can be modeled as extensive-
form games (EFGs) that are capable of describing scenarios with stochastic
events and imperfect information. EFGs can model recreational games, such as
poker [1], as well as real-world situations in physical security [2], auctions [3],
or medicine [4]. EFGs are represented as game trees where nodes correspond
to states of the game and edges to actions of players. Imperfect information
of players is represented by grouping indistinguishable states of a player into
information sets, which form the decision points of the players.
There are two approaches to making decisions in EFGs. First, there are on-
line (or game-playing) algorithms which given the observation of the game state
compute the action to be played. Second, there are offline algorithms which
compute (approximate) the strategy in the whole game and play according to
this strategy. The offline algorithms typically provide a better approximation
of equilibrium strategies in large games compared to the online algorithms [5].
One exception is the recently introduced continual resolving algorithm used in
DeepStack [6], which provides less exploitable strategies than existing offline
algorithms in heads-up no-limit Texas Hold’em poker. The main caveat of this
algorithm is that it exploits the specific structure of poker where all actions of
players are observable, and its generalization to other games is not straightfor-
ward. Another advantage of offline algorithms is that they simplify the deploy-
ment in real-world applications since the strategy (a probabilistic distribution
over actions in each information set) is precomputed and can be simply stored
on any device. It can then be accessed by deployed units such as park rangers
(see, e.g., [7]) without the need of large computational resources necessary when
using online algorithms. We thus focus on offline algorithms.
Most of the existing offline algorithms [8, 9, 10] require players to remember
all the information gained during the game – a property denoted as a perfect
recall. This requirement comes with a significant disadvantage: The number of
decision points, and hence both the memory required during the computation
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and the memory required to store the resulting strategy, grows exponentially
with the number of moves. The reason behind the exponential growth is that the
perfect recall allows the player to condition his behavior on all his actions taken
in the past (the number of these histories is exponential). For example, the
perfect recall extensive-form representation of the heads-up limit Texas hold’em
poker has more than 1014 decision points [11], even storing strategy for a game
of this size requires prohibitive memory. Therefore, a popular approach is to use
information abstractions [12] The information abstraction reduces the size of the
original large extensive-form game by removing information available to players;
hence merging their information sets. Since the players have to play identical
strategy in the merged information sets, the size of the strategy representation
in the abstracted game can be significantly smaller than in the original game.
The abstracted game is then solved, and the small resulting strategies are used
in the original game. The majority of existing algorithms (e.g., see [13, 14,
15, 16]) create perfect recall abstractions. However, the requirement of perfect
recall in the abstraction severely limits possible memory savings, since it still
forces players to remember all the moves they made in the past; hence the
number of decision points in the abstracted game still grows exponentially with
the increasing number of moves. To achieve additional memory savings, the
assumption of perfect recall may need to be violated in the abstracted game
resulting in an imperfect recall.
Solving imperfect recall games is known to be a difficult problem [17, 18].
Hence, there is only a limited amount of work that relaxes the perfect recall
restriction in abstractions. Very specific imperfect recall abstractions that al-
low using perfect recall solution techniques are chance relaxed skew well-formed
games [19, 20] and normal-form games with sequential strategies [21, 2]. Chance
relaxed skew well-formed games only merge information sets which satisfy strict
restrictions on the structure of the game tree above and below them. These
restrictions imply that for all possible strategies of the opponent, a strategy
which is optimal in one of the merged information sets must have bounded dis-
tance from the optimal strategy in the rest of the merged information sets. In
normal-form games with sequential strategies, players cannot observe actions
of the opponent at all. Even though these restrictions simplify solving of the
abstracted game, they prevent us from creating sufficiently small and useful
abstracted games and thus fully exploit the possibilities of imperfect recall.
Existing methods for using imperfect recall abstractions without severe limita-
tions cannot provide any guarantees of the quality of computed strategies [22],
or assume that the abstraction is given and require computationally complex
approximation of a bilinear program to solve it [23].
1.1. Our Contribution
In this work, we take a novel approach to imperfect recall information ab-
stractions, which does not require any specific structure of the imperfect re-
call abstracted game nor does it use computationally complex algorithms to
solve it. Instead, we introduce two domain-independent algorithms, which are
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able to start with an arbitrary imperfect recall abstraction of the solved two-
player zero-sum perfect recall EFG. The algorithms simultaneously solve the
abstracted game, detect the missing information causing problems and return
it to the players. This process is repeated until provable convergence to the
desired approximation of the Nash equilibrium of the original game.
The first algorithm is Fictitious Play for Imperfect Recall Abstractions (FPIRA)1.
FPIRA is based on the Fictitious Play (FP, [25]). As a part of the contribu-
tion, we discuss the problems of applying FP to the imperfect recall abstraction
and how to resolve them. We then demonstrate how to detect the parts of the
abstraction that need to be refined to enable convergence to the Nash equilib-
rium of the original game. We base this detection on the difference between the
quality of the strategies expected from running FP directly on the original two-
player zero-sum EFG with perfect recall and the result obtained from applying
it to the abstraction. Finally, we prove that the guarantee of convergence of FP
to the Nash equilibrium of the original two-player zero-sum EFG with perfect
recall directly translates to the guarantee of convergence of FPIRA to the Nash
equilibrium of this game.
The second algorithm is CFR+ for Imperfect Recall Abstractions (CFR+IRA).
CFR+IRA replaces the FP by CFR+ algorithm [26] since CFR+ is known to
have significantly faster empirical convergence to the Nash equilibrium in two-
player zero-sum EFGs with perfect recall. As a part of the contribution, we
describe problems of applying CFR+ directly to the imperfect recall abstrac-
tion and how to resolve them. To update the abstraction, we compare the
expected theoretical convergence of CFR+ in the original game and the conver-
gence achieved in the abstraction. The abstraction is refined when the observed
convergence is slower than the theoretical guarantee provided by CFR+ in the
original two-player zero-sum EFG with perfect recall. We provide a bound on
the average external regret of CFR+IRA and hence show that CFR+IRA is
guaranteed to converge to the Nash equilibrium of the original two-player zero-
sum EFG with perfect recall. Finally, we provide an efficient heuristic for the
abstraction update and demonstrate that it significantly improves the conver-
gence to the Nash equilibrium of the original EFG.
We assume two possible sources of the initial imperfect recall abstraction
for FPIRA and CFR+IRA. First, we assume that the abstraction is provided
either by a domain expert or as a result of some heuristic abstraction algorithm.
Alternatively, if no such abstraction is available for the solved domain, we pro-
vide a domain-independent algorithm, which builds the initial coarse imperfect
recall abstraction of the given game.
Both algorithms are conceptually similar to the Double Oracle algorithm
(DOEFG, [27]) since they create a smaller version of the original game and re-
peatedly refine it until the desired approximation of the Nash equilibrium of
1A part of this work appeared in [24]. Here, we provide an improved version of the FPIRA
which can use a significantly smaller initial abstraction. Additionally, we significantly extend
the experimental evaluation of the algorithm.
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the original game is found. Our algorithms, however, use imperfect recall in-
formation abstractions during the computation, while DOEFG uses a restricted
perfect recall game, where the players are allowed to play only a subset of their
actions. Hence, the algorithms introduced in this article exploit a completely
different type of sparseness than DOEFG.
In the experimental evaluation, we compare the memory requirements and
runtime of CFR+IRA, FPIRA, and DOEFG. We demonstrate that CFR+IRA
requires at least an order of magnitude less memory than DOEFG and FPIRA to
solve a diverse set of domains. Hence it is the most suitable algorithm for solving
large domains with prohibitive memory requirements. We show that even if
CFR+IRA is initialized with a trivial automatically built abstraction, it requires
to build information abstractions with as little as 0.9% of information sets of the
original game to find the desired approximation of the NE of the original game.
Moreover, the results suggest that the relative size of the abstraction built by
CFR+IRA will further decrease as the size of the solved game increases.
1.2. Related Work on Abstractions
Here, we provide an overview of the related work concerning the use of ab-
stractions to solve large EFGs. There are two distinct approaches to abstracting
an EFG: information abstractions and action abstractions.
The information abstractions reduce the size of the original large extensive-
form game by removing information available to players; hence merging their
information sets. Since the players have to play identical strategy in the merged
information sets, the size of the strategy representation in the abstracted game
can be significantly smaller than in the original game. The abstracted game is
then solved, and the small resulting strategies are used in the original game.
Most of the work on information abstractions was driven by research in the
poker domain. Information abstractions were initially created using domain-
dependent knowledge [28, 29]. Algorithms for creating information abstractions
followed [30, 12] and led to the development of bots with increasing quality
of play in poker. This work culminated in lossless information abstractions
(i.e., abstractions where the strategies obtained by solving the abstracted game
form optimal strategies in the original game) which allowed solving the Rhode
Island Hold’em, a game with 3.1 · 109 nodes in the game tree [13]. When
moving to larger games, lossless abstractions were found to be too restrictive
to offer sufficient reductions in the size of the abstracted game. Hence the
focus switched to lossy abstractions. A mathematical framework that can be
used to create perfect recall information abstractions with bounds on solution
quality was introduced [14]. Additionally, both lossless and lossy imperfect recall
abstractions were provided in [19, 20]. The authors show that running the CFR
algorithm on this class of imperfect recall abstractions leads to a bounded regret
in the full game. In this work, we also focus on imperfect recall abstractions
(see the next section for the comparison of our approach to the state-of-the-art).
Another form of abstractions are action abstractions. Instead of merging
information sets, this abstraction methodology restricts the actions available to
the players in the original game. Similarly to information abstractions, most of
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the work on action abstraction was driven by the poker domain where there is
a prohibitive amount of actions available to the players (e.g., when betting the
players can choose any value up to the number of chips they have available). The
first automated techniques iteratively adjust the bet sizing in no-limit hold’em
[31, 32]. The algorithm for simultaneous action abstraction finding and game
solving was introduced in [15]. This approach is similar to the algorithms pre-
sented in this work since it starts with a coarse abstraction and iteratively refines
it until guaranteed convergence to the Nash equilibrium of the solved game (see
the next section for the comparison of our approach to the state-of-the-art).
The combination of information abstractions and action abstractions was
at the hearth of a number of algorithms for solving heads-up no-limit Texas
Hold’em poker (see, e.g., [33]). Furthermore, the algorithm Libratus [16] using
both mentioned abstractions led to a superhuman performance in heads-up no-
limit Texas Hold’em.
In other domains, abstractions with bounded error were introduced in Pa-
trolling Security Games [34]. Additionally, the first general framework for lossy
game abstraction with bounds was provided for stochastic games [35].
1.3. Comparison of our Contribution to the Related Work
There are several advantages of our algorithms compared to the above men-
tioned related work.
(1) Both algorithms are domain independent, while the majority of the work
mentioned above works specifically for poker.
(2) Our algorithms use imperfect recall abstractions. Hence the possible
memory savings can be exponentially larger than in the case of approaches
restricted to perfect recall.
(3) Our algorithms can be initialized by an arbitrary imperfect recall abstrac-
tion since the choice of the initial abstraction does not affect the convergence
guarantees of the algorithms. Hence, e.g., in poker, we can use the existing
state-of-the-art abstractions used by the top poker bots. Even though these
abstractions have no guarantee that they allow solving the original poker to
optimality, our algorithms will further refine these abstractions when necessary
and provide the desired approximation of the Nash equilibrium in the original
game. If there is no suitable abstraction available for the solved game, the algo-
rithms can start with a simple coarse imperfect recall abstraction (we provide
a domain independent algorithm for constructing such abstraction) and again
update the abstraction until it allows approximation of the Nash equilibrium of
the original game to the desired precision.
(4) The strategy from the final abstracted game can be directly applied to
the original game without the need to use any translation techniques.
(5) The abstraction is built based on the intermediate results of the algorithm
used to solve it. Hence the abstraction is expected to be specifically tailored to
the needs of the given algorithm and therefore small.
The approach bearing the highest resemblance to FPIRA and CFR+IRA
is the algorithm for simultaneous action abstraction finding and game solving
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Figure 1: An imperfect recall game. Circle nodes represent the states of the game, labels in
the circles show which player acts in that node (player 1, player 2 or chance player N), dashed
lines represent indistinguishable states and box nodes are the terminal states with utility value
for player 1 (the game is zero-sum, hence player 1 maximizes the utility, player 2 minimizes
it).
introduced in [15]. This algorithm builds a coarse action abstraction using only
a small subset of the actions of the original game. It then iteratively solves this
abstraction using CFR and adds actions to the abstraction until convergence to
the Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is domain independent with guaranteed
convergence to the NE. However, its empirical success is caused by the specific
structure of poker where all the actions of players are public. The algorithm
iteratively adds parts of the original game denoted as imperfect information
subgames, which tend to be small in poker. However, when not restricted to
poker, the imperfect information subgame can have the size comparable to the
size of the original game. To show that CFR+IRA and FPIRA do not have
such drawbacks, in Section 5 we empirically demonstrate that both algorithms
perform well on a set of domains with a diverse structure.
2. Extensive-Form Games
A two-player extensive-form game (EFG) is a tupleG = (N ,H,Z,A, u, C, I),
which is commonly visualized as a game tree (see Figure 1).
N = {1, 2} is a set of players, by i we refer to one of the players, and by
−i to his opponent. Additionally, the chance player N represents the stochastic
environment of the game. A denotes the set of all actions labeling the edges of
the game tree. H is a finite set of histories of actions taken by all players and the
chance player from the root of the game. Each history corresponds to a node in
the game tree; hence, we use the terms history and node interchangeably. Z ⊆ H
is the set of all terminal states of the game corresponding to the leaves of the
game tree. For each z ∈ Z and i ∈ N we define a utility function ui : Z → R. If
ui(z) = −u−i(z) for all z ∈ Z, we say that the game is zero-sum. Chance player
selects actions based on a fixed probability distribution known to all players.
Function C : H → [0, 1] is the probability of reaching h obtained as the product
of probabilities of actions of chance player preceding h. We further overload C
and use it to denote the probability C(a) that action a of chance player is taken.
Imperfect observation of player i is modeled via information sets Ii that form a
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Figure 2: (a) Extensive-form game G. (b) Imperfect recall infromation abstraction of G.
partition over h ∈ H where i takes action. Player i cannot distinguish between
nodes in any I ∈ Ii. We represent the information sets as nodes connected by
dashed lines in the examples. A(I) denotes actions available in each h ∈ I. The
action a uniquely identifies the information set where it is available, i.e., for all
distinct I, I ′ ∈ I ∀a ∈ A(I) ∀a′ ∈ A(I ′) a 6= a′. An ordered list of all actions
of player i from the root to node h is referred to as a sequence, σi = seqi(h).
Σi is a set of all sequences of player i. We use seqi(I) as a set of all sequences
of player i leading to I. A game has perfect recall iff ∀i ∈ N ∀I ∈ Ii, for all
h, h′ ∈ I holds that seqi(h) = seqi(h′). If there exists at least one information
set where this does not hold (denoted as imperfect recall information set), the
game has imperfect recall.
2.1. Information Abstraction
By information abstraction of a game G = (N ,H,Z, u, I,A) we denote a
game Gx = (N ,H,Z, u, Ix,Ax) (when iteratively building the abstraction, we
willl use x to refer to the abstraction in a specific iteration). Gx differs from G
in the structure of information sets and hence also in the action labeling. Each
I ∈ Ix groups one or more information sets in I. Ax changes A so that each
action a again uniquely identifies the information set in Ix where it is available.
Furthermore, ∀I ∈ Ix∀h, h′ ∈ I Ax(h) = Ax(h′).
To formally describe the information abstraction, we define mappings Φx :
I → Ix, which for each I ∈ I returns the information set containing I in Gx and
Φ−1x : Ix → ℘(I), the inverse of Φx. By Ξx : A → Ax and Ξ−1x : Ax → ℘(A) we
denote the mapping of actions from G to Gx and vice versa.
We say that I ∈ Ix is an abstracted information set if |Φ−1x (I)| > 1. By
I˜x ⊆ Ix we denote the set of all abstracted information sets in Gx.
Example 1. In Figure 2(a) we show an extensive-form game G and in Figure
2(b) its imperfect recall abstraction Gx. In this case,
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Φx : {I1 → I5, I2 → I5, I3 → I6, I4 → I6},
Φ−1x : {I5 → {I1, I2}, I6 → {I3, I4}},
Ξx : {c→ t, e→ t, d→ u, f → u, g → v, i→ v, h→ w, j → w},
Ξ−1x : {t→ {c, e}, u→ {d, f}, v → {g, i}, w → {h, j}},
I˜x = {I5, I6}.
2.2. Strategies in Imperfect Recall Games
There are several representations of strategies in EFGs. A pure strategy si
for player i is a mapping assigning ∀I ∈ Ii an element of A(I). Si is a set of all
pure strategies for player i. A mixed strategy mi is a probability distribution
over Si, set of all mixed strategies of i is denoted as Mi. Behavioral strategy
bi assigns a probability distribution over A(I) for each I ∈ Ii. Bi is a set of
all behavioral strategies for i, Bpi ⊆ Bi is the set of deterministic behavioral
strategies for i. A strategy profile is a set of strategies, one strategy for each
player.
Definition 1. A pair of strategies xi, yi of player i with arbitrary representation
is realization equivalent if ∀z ∈ Z : pixii (z) = piyii (z), where pixii (z) is a probability
that z is reached due to strategy xi of player i when the rest of the players play
to reach z.
We overload the notation and use ui as the expected utility of i when the
players play according to pure (mixed, behavioral) strategies.
Behavioral strategies and mixed strategies have the same expressive power
in perfect recall games, but it can differ in imperfect recall games [36] (see [23]
for more detailed discussion).
Moreover, the size of these representations differs significantly. Mixed strate-
gies of player i state probability distribution over Si, where |Si| ∈ O(2|Z|), be-
havioral strategies create probability distribution over the set of actions (there-
fore, its size is proportional to the number of information sets, which can be
exponentially smaller than |Z|). Hence, behavioral strategies are more memory
efficient strategy representation. Additionally, when used in combination with
information abstractions, behavioral strategies directly benefit from the reduced
number of information sets in the abstracted game.
Finally, we define the Nash equilibrium, ε-Nash equilibrium and the ex-
ploitability of a strategy.
Definition 2. We say that strategy profile b = {b∗i , b∗−i} is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) in behavioral strategies iff ∀i ∈ N ∀b′i ∈ Bi : ui(b∗i , b∗−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b∗−i).
Informally, a strategy profile is a NE if and only if no player wants to deviate
to a different strategy.
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Definition 3. We say that strategy profile b = {b∗i , b∗−i} is an ε-Nash equi-
librium (ε-NE) in behavioral strategies iff ∀i ∈ N ∀b′i ∈ Bi : ui(b∗i , b∗−i) ≥
ui(b
′
i, b
∗
−i)− ε.
Informally, a strategy profile is a ε-NE if and only if no player can gain more
than ε by deviating to a different strategy.
Definition 4. We define the exploitability of a strategy bi as
max
b′i∈Bi
min
b′−i∈B−i
ui(b
′
i, b
′
−i)− min
b′−i∈B−i
ui(bi, b
′
−i).
Informally, the exploitability of a strategy of player i corresponds to the
highest loss the player i can suffer for not playing the strategy maximizing his
worst case expected outcome.
3. Iterative Algorithms for Solving EFGs
In this section we describe the Fictitious Play (FP, [25]), we follow with the
description of ideas behind external regret, Counterfactual Regret Minimization
(CFR, [9]) and its variant CFR+ [26, 37].
3.1. Fictitious Play
Fictitious play (FP) is an iterative algorithm originaly defined for normal-
form games [25]. It keeps track of average mixed strategies m¯Ti , m¯
T
−i of both
players. Players take turn updating their average strategy as follows. In it-
eration T , player i computes sTi ∈ BR(m¯T−1−i ). He then updates his average
strategy m¯Ti =
Ti−1
Ti
m¯T−1i +
1
Ti
sTi (Ti is the number of updates performed by
i plus 1). In two-player zero-sum games m¯Ti , m¯
T
−i converge to a NE [38]. Fur-
thermore, there is a long-standing conjecture [39, 40] that the convergence rate
of FP is O(T−
1
2 ), the same order as the convergence rate of CFR (though the
empirical convergence of CFR and CFR+ tends to be better).
When applying FP to behavioral strategies in perfect recall zero-sum EFG G,
one must compute the average behavioral strategy b¯ti such that it is realization
equivalent to m¯ti obtained when solving the normal form game corresponding
to G for all t and all i ∈ N to keep the convergence guarantees. To update the
behavioral strategy in such a way we use the following Lemma [41].
Lemma 1. Let bi, b
′
i be two behavioral strategies and mi, m
′
i two mixed strate-
gies realization equivalent to bi, b
′
i, and λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1], λ1 + λ2 = 1. Then
b′′i (I) = bi(I) +
λ2pi
b′i
i (I)
λ1pi
bi
i (I) + λ2pi
b′i
i (I)
(b′i(I)− bi(I)),∀I ∈ Ii,
defines a behavioral strategy b′′i realization equivalent to the mixed strategy m
′′
i =
λ1mi + λ2m
′
i.
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3.2. External Regret
Given a sequence of behavioral strategy profiles b1, ..., bT , the external regret
for player i, defined as
RTi = max
b′i∈Bi
T∑
t=1
(ui(b
′
i, b
t
−i)− ui(bti, bt−i)), (1)
is the amount of additional expected utility player i could have gained if he
played the best possible strategy across all time steps t ∈ {1, ..., T} compared
to the expected utility he got from playing bti in every t. An algorithm is a
no-regret algorithm for player i, if the average external regret approaches zero;
i.e.,
lim
T→∞
RTi
T
= 0.
3.3. Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Let btI→a be the strategy profile b
t except for I, where a ∈ A(I) is played.
Let pib(h) be the probability that h will be reached when players play according
to the strategy profile b, with pibi (h) =
∏
a∈seqi(h) b(a) being the contribution of
player i and pib−i,c(h) = C(h)
∏
a∈seq−i(h) b(a) the contribution of −i and chance.
z[I] stands for the state h which is the predecessor of z in I. Let pib(h, h′) be the
probability that h′ will be reached from h when players play according to b and
ZI ⊆ Z a set of leaves reachable from all h ∈ I. Finally, let the counterfactual
value of i in information set I when players play according to the strategy profile
b be
vi(b, I) =
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z)pi
b
−i,c(z[I])pi
b(z[I], z).
Counterfactual regret is defined for each iteration T , player i, information set
I ∈ Ii and action a ∈ A(I) as
RTi (I, a) =
T∑
t=1
[
vi(b
t
I→a, I)− vi(bt, I)
]
. (2)
Let (x)
+
stand for max(x, 0). The strategy bTi for player i in iteration T
in the standard CFR algorithm (sometimes termed vanilla CFR) is computed
from counterfactual regrets using the regret-matching as follows
bTi (I, a) =

(RT−1i (I,a))
+∑
a′∈A(I)(R
T−1
i (I,a
′))
+ , if
∑
a′∈A(I)
(
RT−1i (I, a
′)
)+
> 0
1
A(I) , otherwise.
(3)
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The immediate counterfactual regret is defined as
RTi,imm(I) =
1
T
max
a∈A(I)
RTi (I, a).
In games having perfect recall, minimizing the immediate counterfactual re-
gret in every information set minimizes the average external regret. This holds
because perfect recall implies that
RTi
T
≤
∑
I∈Ii
(
RTi,imm(I)
)+
, (4)
i.e., the external regret is bounded by the sum of positive parts of immediate
counterfactual regrets [9].
Let ∆I = maxz∈ZI ui(z)−minz∈ZI ui(z) and umax = maxi∈N maxz∈Z ui(z).
When player i plays according to eq. (3) in I during iterations {1, ..., T}, then
RTi,imm(I) ≤
∆I
√|A(I)|√
T
. (5)
Thus, from eq. (4)
RTi
T
≤ ∆|Ii|
√|Amax|√
T
, (6)
where |Amax| = maxI∈Ii |A(I)| and ∆ = 2umax [9].
Furthermore, let b¯Ti be the average strategy for i defined as
b¯Ti (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 pi
bti
i (I)b
t
i(I, a)∑T
t=1 pi
bti
i (I)
, ∀I ∈ Ii, ∀a ∈ A(I). (7)
If
RTi
T < ε for all i ∈ N in a two-player zero-sum EFG, the strategy profile
b¯T = (b¯T1 , b¯
T
2 ) forms a 2ε-Nash equilibrium [9].
3.4. CFR+
The CFR+ [26, 37] replaces the regret-matching shown in equation (3) with
regret-matching+. To do that, the algorithm maintains alternative regret values
QTi (I, a) in each iteration T and for each player i defined as
Q0i (I, a) = 0 (8)
QTi (I, a) =
(
QT−1i (I, a) +R
T
i (I, a)−RT−1i (I, a)
)+
. (9)
The update of QTi (I, a) is identical to the update of R
T
i (I, a) in eq. (2)
except for negative values which are replaced by 0. This prevents negative
counterfactual regrets from accumulating. Since the strategy is then computed
using the regret-matching+ defined as
bTi (I, a) =

QT−1i (I,a)∑
a′∈A(I) Q
T−1
i (I,a
′)
, if
∑
a′∈A(I)Q
T−1
i (I, a
′) > 0
1
A(I) , otherwise,
(10)
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any future positive regret changes will immediatelly affect the resulting strategy
instead of canceling out with the accumulated negative regret values.
Additionally, CFR+ uses alternating updates of the regrets, i.e., during one
iteration of the algorithm only regrets of one player are updated, and the players
take turn.
Finally, as described in [37], the update of the average strategy starts only
after a fixed number of iterations denoted as d. The update is then weighted by
the current iteration, formally for each T > d
b¯Ti (I, a) =
2
∑T
t=d t · pi
bti
i (I) · bti(I, a)
((T − d)2 + T − d)∑Tt=d pibtii (I) , ∀I ∈ Ii,∀a ∈ A(I). (11)
Intuitively, the average strategy update puts a higher weight on later strate-
gies, as they are expected to perform better.
The bound on average external regret
RTi
T from eq. (6) also holds when us-
ing regret matching+. Hence the average strategy profile computed by CFR+
converges to the Nash equilibrium of the solved two-player zero-sum EFG [37].
Additionally, the empirical convergence of CFR+ is significantly better com-
pared to CFR [37].
4. Algorithms for Constructing and Solving Imperfect Recall Ab-
stractions
In this section, we present the main algorithmic results of this paper. We
first discuss the initial imperfect recall abstraction of a given two-player zero-sum
EFG G which forms a starting point of the algorithms. Note that in this section
we focus on the scenario where no initial abstraction is given, and the algorithms
need to automatically build the initial coarse imperfect recall abstraction. We
follow with the description of the two algorithms which iteratively solve and
refine this abstraction until they reach the desired approximation of the Nash
equilibrium of the original unabstracted game G. In Section 4.2 we present the
FP based approach denoted as Fictitious Play for Imperfect Recall Abstractions
(FPIRA). In Section 4.3 we show the approach using a modification of CFR+ to
iteratively solve and refine this abstraction. We denote the algorithm CFR+ for
Imperfect Recall Abstractions (CFR+IRA). We provide proofs of convergence of
both algorithms to the NE of the original unabstracted game and the discussion
of memory requirements and runtime performance of both algorithms.
4.1. Abstraction
As discussed before, the algorithms presented in this section can start from
an arbitrary initial imperfect recall abstraction. In Section 4.1.1, we demon-
strate how to create a coarse imperfect recall abstraction which serves as a
starting point of the algorithms if no initial abstraction is given.
We refer to the initial abstraction of the solved two-player zero-sum EFG
G as G1 = (N ,H,Z, u, I1,A1). In every iteration t, the algorithms operate
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with possibly more refined abstraction with respect to G1, denoted as Gt =
(N ,H,Z, u, It,At).
4.1.1. Initial Abstraction
Given a game G, the initial abstraction G1 is created in the following way:
Each I ∈ I1i is formed as the largest set of information sets II of G, so that
∀I ′, I ′′ ∈ II |seqi(I ′)| = |seqi(I ′′)|∧|A(I ′)| = |A(I ′′)|. Furthermore,
⋃
I∈I1 II =
I. Informally, for each i ∈ N , the algorithm groups together information sets of i
with the same length of the sequence of i leading there and with the same number
of actions available. Additionally, when creating some abstracted information
set I by grouping all information sets in II , we need to specify the mapping
Ξ−11 (a) for all a ∈ A1. When creating the initial abstraction, the algorithm
simply uses the order of actions given by the domain description to create A1
(i.e., the first action available in each I ′ ∈ II is mapped to the first action in
A1(I), etc.).
4.2. The FPIRA Algorithm
Let us now describe the Fictitious Play for Imperfect Recall Abstractions
(FPIRA). We first give a high-level idea behind FPIRA. Next, we provide
the pseudocode with the description of all steps and prove its convergence in
two-player zero-sum EFGs. Finally, we discuss the memory requirements and
runtime of FPIRA.
Given a perfect recall game G, FPIRA creates a coarse imperfect recall
abstraction G1 of G as described in Section 4.1.1. The algorithm then follows
the FP procedure. It keeps track of average strategies of both players in the
information set structure of the abstraction and updates the strategies in every
iteration based on the best responses to the average strategies. Note that the
best responses are computed directly in G (see Section 5 for empirical evidence
that these best responses are small). To ensure the convergence to Nash equi-
librium of G, FPIRA refines the information set structure of the abstraction in
every iteration to make sure that the strategy update does not lead to more ex-
ploitable average strategies in the following iterations compared to the strategy
update made directly in G.
In Algorithm 1 we present the pseudocode of FPIRA. FPIRA is given the
original perfect recall game G = (N ,H,Z, u, I,A) and a desired precision of NE
approximation ε. FPIRA first creates the coarse imperfect recall abstraction
G1 of G (line 1) as described in Section 4.1.1. Next, it initializes the strategies
of both players to an arbitrary pure strategy in G1 (line 2). FPIRA then
iterativelly solves and updates G1 until convergence to ε−Nash equilibrium of
G. In every iteration it updates the average strategy of one of the players and
if needed the information set structure of the abstraction (the game used in
iteration t is denoted as Gt). In every iteration player i first computes the best
response bti to b¯
t−1
−i in G (line 6, Section 4.2.1). Since b
t
i is computed in G,
FPIRA first needs to make sure that the structure of information sets in Gt
allows bti to be played. If not, G
t is updated as described in Section 4.2.2, Case
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Algorithm 1: FPIRA algorithm
input : G, ε
output : b¯Ti , b¯
T
−i, G
T
1 G1 ← InitAbstraction(G)
2 b¯01 ← PureStrat(G1), b¯02 ← PureStrat(G1)
3 t← 1
4 while u1(BR(G, b¯
t−1
2 ), b¯
t−1
2 )− u1(b¯t−11 , BR(G, b¯t−11 )) > ε do
5 i← ActingPlayer(t)
6 bti ← BR(G, b¯t−1−i )
7 Gt ← RefineForBR(Gt, bti, b¯ti)
8 bˆti ← UpdateStrategy(Gt, b¯t−1i , bti)
9 b˜ti ← UpdateStrategy(G, b¯t−1i , bti)
10 if ComputeDelta(G, bˆti, b˜
t
i) > 0 then
11 Gt+1 ← Refine(Gt), b¯ti ← b˜ti
12 else
13 Gt+1 ← Gt, b¯ti ← bˆti
14 t← t+ 1
1 (line 7). Next, FPIRA computes bˆti as the strategy resulting from the update
in Gt (line 8) and b˜ti as the strategy resulting from the update in original game
G (line 9). FPIRA then checks whether the update in Gt changes the expected
values of the pure strategies of −i compared to the update in G using bˆti and
b˜ti (line 10, Section 4.2.2 Case 2). If yes, FPIRA refines the information set
structure of Gt, creating Gt+1 such that when updating the average strategies
in Gt+1 no error in expected values of pure strategies of −i is created (Section
4.2.2, Case 2). FPIRA then sets b¯ti = b˜
t
i (line 11), and continues using G
t+1. If
there is no need to update the structure of Gt, FPIRA sets Gt+1 = Gt, b¯ti = bˆ
t
i
and continues with the next iteration.
4.2.1. Best Response Computation
In Algorithm 2 we present the pseudocode for computing the best response
bBRi of i against b¯−i in G. The algorithm recursivelly traverses the parts of
the game tree reachable by b¯−i and computes the best action to be played in
each I ∈ Ii encountered. More formally, when the best response computation
reaches state h, where i plays, it first finds the information set I such that h ∈ I
(line 14). The algorithm then finds the action amax which maximizes the sum
of expected values of i, when i plays the best response to b¯−i, over all h ∈ I (line
15). The expected value of playing amax in h is prepared to be propagated up
(line 17) and the prescription of playing amax in I is stored to the best response
(line 18). Notice, that to eliminate revisiting already traversed parts of the game
tree on lines 15 and 17, we use cache. The cache stores the values computed by
the BR for each h ∈ H visited during the computation (line 16) and provides
this value if h is revisited (lines 10 to 12). Finally, since we are searching for a
pure best response bBRi , there is no need to store the behavior in the parts of
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Algorithm 2: Best response computation.
1 function BR(G, b¯−i)
2 bBRi ← ∅
3 BR(G.root, G, b¯−i, bBRi )
4 return bBRi
5 function BR(h, G, b¯−i, bBRi )
6 if pi
b¯−i
i (h) = 0 then
7 return 0
8 if IsGameEnd(h) then
9 return C(h) · pib¯−ii (h) · ui(h)
10 v ← GetValueFromCache(h)
11 if v 6= null then
12 return v
13 if GetPlayerToMove(h) = i then
14 I ← GetInformationSetFor(h, I)
15 amax ← arg maxa∈A(I)
∑
h′∈I BR(h
′ · a, G, b¯−i, bBRi )
16 For each h′ ∈ I store vh′ = BR(h′ · amax, G, b¯−i, bBRi ) to cache
17 v ← BR(h · amax, G, b¯−i, bBRi )
18 bBRi ← bBRi ∪ {I → amax}
19 CleanUnreachable(bBRi )
20 else
21 v ←∑a∈A(h)BR(h · a, G, b¯−i, bBRi )
22 return v
the tree unreachable when playing bBRi . Hence to reduce the memory needed
to store bBRi , we delete the prescription in all I ∈ Ii which cannot be reached
due to player i playing amax (line 19).
In case of nodes of player −i and chance, the algorithm simply propagates
up the values of successors (line 21).
Prunning. The implementation of the best response used in FPIRA incor-
porates pruning based on the lower bound and upper bound in each node h of
the game tree. The lower bound represents the lowest value that needs to be
achieved in h to make sure that there is a chance that searching the subtree
of h influences the resulting best response and the upper bound represents the
estimate of how much can the best responding player gain by visiting h. For a
more detailed discussion of the pruning see [27], Section 4.2.
4.2.2. Updating Gt
There are two reasons for splitting some I ∈ I˜ti in iteration t where player i
computes the best response. First, the best response computed in G prescribes
more than one action in I. Second, I causes the expected value of some pure
strategy of −i to be different against the average strategy of i computed in Gt
compared to the expected value against the average strategy computed in G.
This can happen since I is an abstracted information set, and hence updating
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the average strategy in I in Gt changes the behavior in multiple information
sets in G (see Example 2 for more details).
Algorithm 3: Abstraction update to accomodate best response.
1 function RefineForBR(Gt, bti, b¯
t
i)
2 for I ∈ I˜ti do
3 if pi
bti
i (I) > 0 then
4 I′′ ← ∅
5 for a ∈ At(I) do
6 Iˆa ← ∅
7 for I ′ ∈ φ−1t (I) do
8 if ∃a ∈ A(I ′) such that bti(I, a) = 1 then
9 a′ ← a ∈ A(I ′) such that bti(I, a) = 1
10 a← Ξt(a′)
11 Iˆa ← Iˆa ∪ I ′
12 else
13 I′′ ← I′′ ∪ I ′
14 Iˆ ← ∅
15 for a ∈ At(I) do
16 if Iˆa 6= ∅ then
17 Iˆ ← Iˆ ∪ {Iˆa}
18 if |Iˆ| > 1 then
19 for I ′ ∈ Iˆ ∪ I′′ do
20 b¯ti(I
′)← b¯ti(I)
21 b¯ti ← b¯ti \ b¯ti(I)
22 It ← It \ I
23 for Iˆa ∈ Iˆ do
24 It ← It ∪ CreateNewIS(Iˆa)
25 if I′′ 6= ∅ then
26 It ← It ∪ CreateNewIS(I′′)
27 return Gt
Case 1: Here we discuss the abstraction update which guarantees that the
best response bti computed in G is applicable in the resulting abstraction. This
abstraction update first detects every I ∈ I˜ti where the bti prescribes more than
one action. It then splits each such I by grouping the information sets in
φ−1t (I) to the largest possible subsets where b
t
i prescribes the same action. One
additional information set is created containing all I ′ ∈ φ−1t (I) which are not
reachable when playing bti.
In Algorithm 3 we show the pseudocode for this abstraction update. The
algorithm iterates over all abstracted information sets I ∈ I˜ti that can be vis-
ited when playing bti (lines 2 and 3). Each such I is first divided to a sets of
information sets Iˆ and I ′′. Let Iˆa ⊆ Φ−1t (I) be a union of all I ′ ∈ Φ−1t (I) where
bti(I
′, a′) = 1 for Ξt(a′) = a (lines 5 to 11). Iˆ is a union of Iˆa for all a ∈ At(I)
(lines 14 to 17). I ′′ contains all I ′ ∈ Φ−1t (I) for which bti does not prescribe any
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action (line 13). If there is more than one element in Iˆ (line 18), the average
strategy before the strategy update in all information sets which are about to
be created is set to the strategy previously played in I (lines 19 to 21). Next,
the algorithm removes I from Gt (line 22). Finally, it creates new informations
set for each Iˆa ∈ Iˆ, that contains all I ′ ∈ Iˆa and an information set containing
all I ′ ∈ I ′′ (lines 23 to 26).
Algorithm 4: Abstraction update guaranteeing that the expected values
of all pure strategies of −i are the same against the strategy resulting from
update in G and Gt.
1 function Refine(Gt, bti, b¯
t
i)
2 for I ∈ I˜ti do
3 if pi
bti
i (I) > 0 then
4 Iˆ ← {I ′ ∈ φ−1t (I)|pib
t
i
i (I
′) > 0}
5 I′′ ← φ−1t (I) \ Iˆ
6 It ← It \ I
7 for I ′ ∈ Iˆ ∪ I′′ do
8 b¯ti(I
′)← b¯ti(I)
9 b¯ti ← b¯ti \ b¯ti(I)
10 if I′′ 6= ∅ then
11 It ← It ∪ CreateNewIS(I′′)
12 for I ′ ∈ Iˆ do
13 It ← It ∪ CreateNewIS(I ′)
14 return Gt
Case 2: Now we turn to the abstraction update guaranteeing that the expected
values of all pure strategies of −i against the average strategy of i computed
in Gt are equal to the expected values against the average strategy computed
in G. As a part of this abstraction update, FPIRA constructs the average
strategy bˆti resulting from the update in G
t and b˜ti resulting from the update in
G. It then checks whether there exists a pure strategy of player −i which has
different expected value against bˆti and b˜
t
i. If there exists such pure strategy,
the abstraction is updated to guarantee that the average strategy update in the
abstraction results in b˜ti, and hence that there is no difference in the expected
values of pure strategies of −i.
More formally, the algorithm first constructs the average behavioral strategy
bˆti in G
t (line 8 in Algorithm 1). This is done according to Lemma 1 from
b¯t−1i with weight
ti−1
ti
and bti with weight
1
ti
, where ti is the number of updates
performed by i so far, plus 1 for the initial strategy (bti is used with mappings Φt
and Ξt). Next, FPIRA constructs b˜
t
i (line 9) in the same way in the information
set structure of G (b¯t−1i is used with mappings Φ
−1
t and Ξ
−1
t ). FPIRA then
computes
∆ti = max
b−i∈BP−i
|u−i(˜bti, b−i)− u−i(bˆti, b−i)|,
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as described below (line 10 in Algorithm 1). If ∆ti = 0, all the pure strategies
of −i have the same expected value against both bˆti and b˜ti. In this case, FPIRA
sets Gt+1 = Gt, b¯ti = bˆ
t
i (line 13). If ∆
t
i > 0, the expected value of some pure
strategy of −i changed when updating the strategy in Gt, compared to the
expected value it would get against the strategy updated in G. FPIRA then
creates Gt+1 according to Algorithm 4 in the following way. Every abstracted
information set I ∈ I˜ti which is visited when playing bti (lines 2 and 3) is first
divided to sets of information sets Iˆ ⊆ Φ−1t (I) and I ′′. Iˆ contains all the
I ′ ∈ Φ−1t (I) for which pib
t
i
i (I
′) > 0 (line 4), I ′′ contains the rest of I ′ ∈ Φ−1t (I)
(line 5). The average strategy before the strategy update in all information sets
which are about to be created is set to the strategy previously played in I (lines
7 to 9). The algorithm then creates new information set for each Iˆ ∈ Iˆ, and an
information set containing all I ′ ∈ I ′′ (lines 10 to 13). The strategy resulting
from update in G is a valid strategy in Gt+1 after such update, hence b¯ti = b˜
t
i.
Notice that by setting b¯ti = b˜
t
i, we made sure that ∆
t
i = 0 since the update is
now equal to the update that would occur in G. This, as we will show in Section
4.2.3, is sufficient to guarantee the convergence of b¯ti, b¯
t
−i to Nash equilibrium
of G.
Computing ∆ti. Given bˆ
t
i and b˜
t
i, ∆
t
i can be computed as
∆ti = max
b−i∈Bp−i
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z∈Z
C(z)pib−i−i (z)
[
pi
b˜ti
i (z)− pibˆ
t
i
i (z)
]
u−i(z)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let
u′−i(z) = C(z)
[
pi
b˜ti
i (z)− pibˆ
t
i
i (z)
]
u−i(z), ∀z ∈ Z (12)
u′′−i(z) = −C(z)
[
pi
b˜ti
i (z)− pibˆ
t
i
i (z)
]
u−i(z), ∀z ∈ Z. (13)
∆ti can be computed in O(|Z|) by ComputeDelta depicted in Algorithm 5.
The computation consists of two calls of function ComputePartialDelta similar
to the computation of the best response described in Section 4.2.1. The only
difference is the use of functions shown in eqs. (12) and (13) when evaluating the
leaves (line 9). ComputePartialDelta using u′−i searches for the largest positive
difference in the utility of pure strategies of −i, while ComputePartialDelta using
u′′−i searches for the highest negative difference. The two calls are neccessary,
since ComputePartialDelta using u′−i cannot reliably detect negative differences
in the utility, since it will always prefer choosing pure strategy with no difference
in the utility over the pure strategy with the negative difference. Notice, that
similarly to the best response computation, we use cache to eliminate redundant
tree traversals caused by line 15.
Example 2. Let us demonstrate several iterations of FPIRA algorithm. Con-
sider the EFG from Figure 3(a) as G and the imperfect recall game from Figure
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Algorithm 5: ∆ti computation.
1 function ComputeDelta(G, bˆti, b˜
t
i)
2 Let u′−i be the function from eq. (12)
3 Let u′′−i be the function from eq. (13)
4 return max(ComputePartialDelta(G.root, u′−i, bˆ
t
i, b˜
t
i),
ComputePartialDelta(G.root, u′′−i, bˆ
t
i, b˜
t
i))
5 function ComputePartialDelta(h, u′−i, bˆ
t
i, b˜
t
i)
6 if pi
bˆti
i (h) = 0 ∧ pib˜
t
i
i (h) = 0 then
7 return 0
8 if IsGameEnd(h) then
9 return u′−i(h)
10 v ← GetValueFromCache(h)
11 if v 6= null then
12 return v
13 if GetPlayerToMove(h) = −i then
14 I ← GetInformationSetFor(h, I)
15 amax ← arg maxa∈A(I)
∑
h′∈I ComputePartialDelta(h
′ · a, u′−i, bˆti, b˜ti)
16 For each h′ ∈ I store vh′ = BR(h′ · amax, G, b¯−i, bBRi ) to cache
17 v ← ComputePartialDelta(h · amax, u′−i, bˆti, b˜ti)
18 else
19 v ←∑a∈A(h)ComputePartialDelta(h · a, u′−i, bˆti, b˜ti)
20 return v
3 (b) as G1. The function Ξ1 is Ξ1(t) = Ξ1(v) = c,Ξ1(u) = Ξ1(w) = d, identity
otherwise. Note that when we apply strategies from G to Gt and vice versa in
iteration t, we assume that it is done with respect to Ξt and Ξ
−1
t . Lets assume
that FPIRA first initializes the strategies to b¯01(b) = b¯
0
1(d) = 1, b¯
0
2(e) = 1.
Iteration 1: The player 1 starts in iteration 1. FPIRA computes b11 ∈ BR(b¯02)
in G, resulting in b11(b) = b
1
1(v) = 1. Next, FPIRA checks whether b
1
1 is playable
in G1. Since there is no information set in G1 for which b11 assigns more than
one action, we do not need to update G1 in any way. We follow by computing
bˆ11 and b˜
1
1 according to Lemma 1 with λ1 = λ2 = 0.5. In this case bˆ
1
1(b) =
b˜11(b) = 1, bˆ
1
1(c) = b˜
1
1(v) = 0.5. Since bˆ
1
1 and b˜
1
1 are equal, w.r.t. Ξ1, we know
that ∆i = 0. Hence we let G
2 = G1, b¯11 = bˆ
1
1 and Ξ2 = Ξ1.
Iteration 2: Player 2 continues in iteration 2. Notice that information sets
of player 2 were not changed, hence there is no need to discuss this iteration in
such detail. FPIRA computes the best response to b¯11, resulting in b
2
2(f) = 1.
The algorithm then computes bˆ22 and b˜
2
2, resulting in bˆ
2
2(e) = b˜
2
2(e) = 0.5. Hence,
we let G3 = G2, b¯22 = bˆ
2
2 and Ξ3 = Ξ2.
Iteration 3: The best response in this iteration is b31(a) = b
3
1(u) = 1, which is
again playable in G3, hence we do not need to update G3 at this point. FPIRA
computes bˆ31 resulting in bˆ
3
1(a) =
1
3 , bˆ
3
1(d) =
2
3 , b˜
3
1 is, on the other hand, b˜
3
1(a) =
20
Figure 3: (a) G for demonstration of FPIRA iterations (b) G1 for demonstration of FPIRA.
1
3 , b˜
3
1(u) = 1, b˜
3
1(w) = 0.5 (both according to Lemma 1 with λ1 =
2
3 , λ2 =
1
3).
In this case, ∆31 =
1
3 since by playing f player 2 gets
2
3 against bˆ
3
1 compared to
1 against b˜31. Hence, the algorithm splits all imperfect recall information sets
reachable when playing b31, in this case I1, as described in Section 4.2.2, Case
2, resulting in G. Therefore, G4 = G, b¯31 = b˜
3
1 and Ξ4 is set to identity.
4.2.3. Theoretical Properties
Here, we show that the convergence guarantees of FP in two-player zero-sum
perfect recall game G [41] directly apply to FPIRA solving G.
Theorem 1. Let G be a perfect recall two-player zero-sum EFG. Assume that
initial strategies b¯01, b¯
0
2 in FPIRA and initial strategies b¯
′0
1, b¯
′0
2 in the FP are real-
ization equivalent, additionally assume that the same tie breaking rules are used
when more than one best response is available in any iteration. The exploitabil-
ity of b¯ti computed by FPIRA applied to G is exactly equal to the exploitability
of b¯′ti, computed by FP applied to G in all iterations t and for all i ∈ N .
Proof. The proof is done by induction. If
∀b−i ∈ Bp−i : u−i(b¯ti, b−i) = u−i(b¯′ti, b−i), (14)
∀bi ∈ Bpi : ui(bi, b¯t−i) = ui(bi, b¯′t−i), (15)
where Bp is the set of pure behavioral strategies in G, then
b−i ∈ Bp−i : u−i(b¯t+1i , b−i) = u−i(b¯′t+1i , b−i).
The initial step trivially holds from the assumption that initial strategies
in FPIRA and initial strategies and in FP are realization equivalent. Now let
us show that the induction step holds. Let bti be the best response chosen in
iteration t in FPIRA and b′ti be the best response chosen in t in FP. From (15)
and the use of the same tie breaking rule we know that bti = b
′t
i. From Lemma
1 we know that
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∀b−i ∈ Bp−i : u−i(b¯′t+1i , b−i) =
ti
ti + 1
u−i(b¯′
t
i, b−i) +
1
ti + 1
u−i(b
′t
i, b−i).
However, same holds also for b¯t+1i since FPIRA creates G
t+1 from Gt so
that ∆ti = 0. Hence
∀b−i ∈ Bp−i : u−i(b¯t+1i , b−i) =
ti
ti + 1
u−i(b¯
t
i, b−i) +
1
ti + 1
u−i(b
t
i, b−i).
From (14) and from the equality bti = b
′t
i follows that
∀b−i ∈ Bp−iu−i(b¯t+1i , b−i) = u−i(b¯′t+1i , b−i),
and therefore also
max
b−i∈Bp−i
u−i(b¯
t+1
i , b−i) = max
b−i∈Bp−i
u−i(b¯′
t+1
i , b−i).
4.2.4. Storing the Information Set Map
In this section we discuss the memory requirements for storing the mapping
of information sets I of G to It of Gt in FPIRA.
Initial abstraction. As decribed in Section 4.1.1, the mapping between any
I ∈ Ii and its abstracted information set in G1 is perfectly defined by |seqi(I)|
and |A(I)|. Hence the mapping can always be determined for any given I ∈ I
without using any additional memory.
Case 1 Update. When updating the abstraction resulting in Gt according
to Case 1 in Section 4.2.2, FPIRA can split I ∈ I˜t−1i to multiple abstracted
information sets. FPIRA is then forced to store the mapping for each newly
created abstracted informations set I ′, for each I ′′ ∈ Φ−1t (I ′). This is neccessary
since |seqi(I ′′)| and |A(I ′′)| is no longer unique identifier of I ′. In our implemen-
tation, we use a unique integer j to represent the new mapping for I ′, i.e., the
algorithm stores j for each I ′′ ∈ Φ−1t (I ′). We use j corresponding to the number
of newly created information sets during the run of FPIRA. Finally, let Imn be
all the information sets in I˜ti such that ∀I ∈ Imn |seqi(I)| = m ∧ |A(I)| = n. We
can always identify the mapping to one of Imn without using any memory by
the sequence length and number of actions, as long as the rest of I ∈ Imn uses
mapping with the unique integer. We keep track of I ∈ Imn with largest |Φ−1t (I)|
in each Imn and use the sequence length and number of actions to represent the
mapping for all Φ−1t (I
′) to minimize the memory requirements. In Section 5
we empirically demonstrate that the memory required to store the mapping is
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small. Notice that in all I ′ ∈ It \ I˜t, the mapping is defined by the domain
description of G and hence no memory is required.
Case 2 Update. When updating the abstraction resulting in Gt according
to Case 2 in Section 4.2.2, there is no additional memory required to store the
updated mapping compared to the mapping used in Gt−1. This holds since this
abstraction update only removes information set from G from the abstracted
information sets in Gt−1. And so we use the same mapping as in Gt−1 for
abstracted information sets in Gt, and the information set structure provided
by the domain description in the rest.
4.2.5. Memory and Time Efficiency
FPIRA needs to store the average behavioral strategy for every action in
every information set of the solved game, hence storing the average strategy in
Gt instead of G results in significant memory savings directly proportional to
the decrease of information set count. When the algorithm computes b˜ti, it can
temporarily refine the information set structure of Gt only in the parts of the
tree that can be visited when playing the pure best response bti according to
Ii to avoid representing and storing G. Additional memory used to store the
current abstraction mapping is discussed in Section 4.2.4.
When computing the best response (see Section 4.2.1), the algorithm needs
to store the best response strategy and the cache that is used to eliminate
additional tree traversals. FPIRA stores the behavior only in the parts of the
game reachable due to actions of i in bti (line 19 in Algorithm 2) and due to b¯
t
−i
(lines 6 and 7 in Algorithm 2). For this reason and since i plays only 1 action in
his information sets in bti, there are typically large parts of the game tree where
bti does not prescribe any behavior. The cache (used also in the computation of
∆ti) stores one number for each state visited during the computation. We show
the size of the cache in Section 5. If necessary, the memory requirements of
the cache can be reduced by limiting its size and hence balancing the memory
required and the additional tree traversals performed. Additionally, efficient
domain-specific implementations of best response (e.g., on poker [42]) can be
employed to further reduce the memory and time requirements.
We empirically demonstrate the size of all the data structures stored during
the run of FPIRA in Section 5.
The iteration of FPIRA takes approximately three times the time needed
to perform one iteration of FP in G, as it now consists of the standard best
response computation in G, two modified best response computations to obtain
∆ti and two updates of average behavioral strategies (which are faster than the
update in G since the average strategy is smaller).
4.3. CFR+ for Imperfect Recall Abstractions
In this section, we describe the CFR+ for Imperfect Recall Abstractions
(CFR+IRA). We first provide a high-level idea of CFR+IRA, followed by de-
tailed explanation of all its parts with pseudocodes and proof of its convergence
to NE in two-player zero-sum EFGs. Finally, we discuss the memory require-
ments and runtime of CFR+IRA.
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Given a two-player zero-sum perfect recall EFG G, CFR+IRA first creates
a coarse imperfect recall abstraction of G as described in Section 4.1.1. The
algorithm then iteratively solves the abstraction using CFR+. All regrets and
average strategies computed as a part of CFR+ are stored in the information set
structure of the abstraction. To ensure the convergence to the Nash equilibrium
ofG, CFR+IRA updates the structure of the abstraction in every iteration based
on the differences between the results obtained by CFR+ in the abstraction and
the expected behavior of CFR+ in G.
Algorithm 6: CFR+ for Imperfect Recall Abstractions
input : G, kh, kb, delay, ε
output: (b¯1, b¯2) – ε-Nash equilibrium of G
1 G1 ← InitAbstraction(G)
2 r ← InitRegrets(I1)
3 b¯1 ← UniformStrategy(I), b¯2 ← UniformStrategy(I)
4 t← 1, tnext ← 1, tlast ← 0, j ← 0
5 rb ← ∅
6 while u1(BR(G, b¯2), b¯2)− u1(b¯1, BR(G, b¯1)) > ε do
7 Iˆh ← SampleInformationSets(I˜ti , kh)
8 rh ← InitRegrets(Iˆh)
9 if t = tnext then
10 Iˆb ← SampleInformationSets(I˜t, kb)
11 rb ← InitRegrets(Iˆb)
12 tlast ← t
13 tnext ← t+ 2j
14 j ← j + 1
15 ComputeRegrets(It, Gt.root, GetPlayer(t), 1, 1, r, rh, rb, Iˆh, Iˆb)
16 RemoveNegativeRegrets(r)
17 if t > delay then
18 UpdateAverageStrategy(r, t)
19 Gt+1 ← UpdateAbstractionForHeuristic(Gt, Iˆh, rh, r, b¯1, b¯2, t)
20 delete rh
21 if t 6= tlast then
22 Gt+1 ← UpdateAbstractionForBound(Gt+1, Iˆb, r, rb, b¯1, b¯2, t, tlast)
23 t← t+ 1
In Algorithm 6 we provide the pseudocode of the CFR+IRA. CFR+IRA is
given the original perfect recall game G, the desired precision of approxima-
tion of the NE ε and the limits kh and kb on the memory that can be used
to update the abstraction. Finally it is given the delay which represents the
number of initial iterations for which the algorithm does not update the average
strategy. The algorithm starts by creating a coarse imperfect recall abstraction
G1 of the given game G (line 1, see Section 4.1.1). It stores the regrets r and
average strategies b¯1, b¯2 for each information set of the current abstraction. The
algorithm then simultaneously solves the abstraction and updates its structure
until the b¯1, b¯2 form an ε-Nash equilibrium of G (line 6). The players take turn
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updating their strategies and regrets. In every iteration, the algorithm updates
the regrets and the current strategy for the acting player i according to CFR+
update (line 15, see Section 3.4 and Algorithm 7). As a part of the CFR+
update the algorithm removes the negative regrets (line 16) and updates the av-
erage strategy (line 18). Note that we follow the CFR+ as described in Section
3.4 and so the update of the average strategy starts only after a fixed number
of iterations denoted as delay. The average strategy is then updated according
to eq. (11).
The algorithm continues with the update of the current abstraction Gt.
There are two procedures for updating the abstraction.
First, the abstraction is updated to guarantee the convergence of the algo-
rithm to the Nash equilibrium (see Section 4.3.1 for more details). As a part of
this abstraction update, CFR+IRA samples a subset Iˆb of information sets of
G (line 10). It then checks the immediate regret in all I ∈ Iˆb for a given number
of iterations before again resampling Iˆb. During these iterations it updates the
abstraction so that any I ∈ Iˆb, where the immediate regret decreases slower
than a given function, is removed from its abstracted information set.
Second, the abstraction is updated using a heuristic update which signifi-
cantly improves the empirical convergence of the algorithm (see Section 4.3.2 for
more details). The heuristic update samples a subset Iˆh of information sets of i
in G in every iteration of CFR+IRA (line 7). It then keeps track of regrets in all
I ∈ Iˆh in this iteration. Finally, it uses these regrets to update the abstraction
so that only information sets with similar regrets remain grouped.
4.3.1. Regret Bound Update
In this section we present more detailed description of the update of the
abstraction based on the regret bound.
Let T T = (T1, ..., Tn) be a sequence of iterations, where every Tj+1−Tj = 2j
for all j ∈ {1, ..., n−1} (the elements of T are computed on line 13 in Algorithm
6). As a part of the abstraction update, the algorithm samples a subset Iˆb ⊆ I
of information sets of G in predetermined iterations specified by elements of T .
The subset Iˆb is sampled on line 10 in Algorithm 6 according to Algorithm 8.
The sampling of Iˆb is done so that ∀I ∈ Iˆb Φt(I) ∈ I˜t and
|Iˆb| = min
kb,∑
I∈I˜t
|Φ−1t (I)|
 .
I.e., the size of Iˆb is limited by the parameter kb and the actual number of
information sets in I that are still mapped to some abstracted information set
in iteration t. Additionally, sampling of information sets on line 6 in Algorithm
8 is performed so that the probability of adding any I ∈ I such that Φt(I) ∈ I˜t
to Iˆb is equal to
1∑
I′∈I˜t |Φ−1t (I ′)|
. (16)
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Algorithm 7: Regret update
1 function ComputeRegrets(I, h, i, pi1, pi2, r, rh, rb, Iˆh, Iˆb)
2 if IsTerminal(h) then
3 return ui(h)
4 if GetPlayerToMove(h)= c then
5 if i = 1 then
6 return
∑
a∈A(h) bc(a)· ComputeRegrets(I, h · a, i, pi1, bc(a) · pi2, r,
rh, rb, Iˆh, Iˆb)
7 return
∑
a∈A(h) bc(a)· ComputeRegrets(I, h · a, i, bc(a) · pi1, pi2, r, rh,
rb, Iˆh, Iˆb)
8 I ← GetInformationSetFor(h, I)
9 rI ← GetRegretsFor(I, r)
10 bt ← RegretMatching+(rI)
11 vbt ← 0
12 v ← Zeros(|A(h)|)
13 for a ∈ A(h) do
14 if i = 1 then
15 v[a]← ComputeRegrets(I, h · a, i, bt(a) · pi1, pi2, r, rh, rb, Iˆh, Iˆb)
16 else
17 v[a]← ComputeRegrets(I, h · a, i, pi1, bt(a) · pi2, r, rh, rb, Iˆh, Iˆb)
18 vbt ← vbt + bt(a) · v[a]
19 if GetPlayerToMove(h)= i then
20 for a ∈ A(h) do
21 rI [a]← rI [a] + pi−i · (v[a]− vbt)
22 if I ∈ Iˆh then
23 rhI ← GetRegretsFor(I, rh)
24 for a ∈ A(h) do
25 rhI [a]← rhI [a] + pi−i · (v[a]− vbt)
26 if I ∈ Iˆb then
27 rbI ← GetRegretsFor(I, rb)
28 for a ∈ A(h) do
29 rbI [a]← rbI [a] + pi−i · (v[a]− vbt)
30 return vbt
After sampling Iˆb in some Tj ∈ T , the algorithm keeps track of the regrets
rb accumulated in each I ∈ Iˆb for Tj+1−Tj iterations during the CFR+ update
(line 26 to 29 in Algorithm 7) before again resampling the Iˆb.
Let LI : {Tj , ..., Tj+1} → R be any function for which
L
Tj
I (t) ≤
∆I
√|A(I)|√
t− Tj
, ∀t ∈ {Tj + 1, ..., Tj+1}.
The actual abstraction update in each iteration T ′ ∈ {Tj + 1, ...Tj+1} is done
according to Algorithm 9 in the following way. The algorithm iterates over
I ∈ I˜t in Gt (line 2). For all I ′′ ∈ Φ−1t (I) ∩ Iˆh the algorithm checks the
immediate regret
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Algorithm 8: Sampling of unabstracted sets for unabstracted regret stor-
age.
1 function SampleInformationSets(I˜, k)
2 Iˆ ← ∅
3 while |Iˆ| < k do
4 if AllSetsSampled(I˜, Iˆ) then
5 break
6 I ← GetRandomAbstractedSet(I˜)
7 I′′ ← Φ−1t (I)
8 if |I′′|+ |Iˆ| ≤ k then
9 Iˆ ← Iˆ ∪ I′′
10 else
11 Iˆ ← Iˆ ∪ random subset of I′′ with size k − |Iˆ|
12 return Iˆ
Algorithm 9: Abstraction update for regret bound
1 function UpdateAbstractionForBound(Gt, Iˆb, r, rb, b¯1, b¯2, t, tlast)
2 for I ∈ I˜t do
3 I′′ ← Φ−1t (I)
4 for I ′′ ∈ Intersection(I′′, Iˆb) do
5 rbI′′ ← GetRegretsFor(I ′′, rb)
6 if
maxa∈A(I′′)r
b
I′′ [a]
t−tlast > L
tlast
I′′ (t) then
7 Inew ← CreateNewIS(I′′ \ I ′′)
8 Gt.I ← Gt.I \ I
9 Gt.I ← Gt.I ∪ {CreateNewIS(I ′′), Inew}
10 rI ← GetRegretsFor(I, r)
11 r ← r \ rI
12 rInew ← InitRegret(Inew)
13 r ← r ∪ rInew
14 rI′′ ← InitRegret(I ′′)
15 r ← r ∪ rI′′
16 Iˆb ← Iˆb \ I ′′
17 rb ← rb \ rbI′′
18 if GetPlayer(t) = 1 then
19 b¯1 ← b¯1\ GetStrategyFor(I, b¯1)
20 else
21 b¯2 ← b¯2\ GetStrategyFor(I, b¯2)
22 return Gt
RT
′
Tj ,imm(I) =
1
T ′ − Tj maxa∈A(I)
T ′∑
t=Tj
[
vi(b
t
I→a, I)− vi(bt, I)
]
=
maxa∈A(I) r
b
I [a]
T ′ − Tj .
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If RT
′
Tj ,imm
(I) > L
Tj
I (T
′) for some T ′ ∈ {Tj+1, ..., Tj+1} (line 6 in Algorithm
9), the algorithm disconnects I in iteration T ′ from its abstracted information
set in GT
′
, resets its regrets to 0 and removes it from Iˆb (lines 7 to 21 in
Algorithm 9). If I is disconnected, the average strategy in I in all T > T ′ is
computed ∀a ∈ A(I) as
b¯Ti (I, a) =

1
|A(I)| , if T = T
′ + 1,
2
∑T
t′=T ′+1 t
′·pib
t′
i
i (I)·bt
′
i (I,a)
((T−T ′−1)2+T−T ′−1)
∑T
t′=T ′+1 pi
bt
′
i
i (I)
, otherwise.
(17)
The average strategy update in eq. (17) corresponds to the average strategy
update descibed in Section 3.4, i.e., it does a weighted average of the bti strategies
over iterations {T ′ + 1, ..., T} with weight corresponding to the iteration.
4.3.2. Heuristic Update
Algorithm 10: Abstraction update for heuristic
1 function UpdateAbstractionForHeuristic(Gt, Iˆh, rh, r, b¯1, b¯2, t)
2 for I ∈ I˜ti do
3 I′′ ← Φ−1t (I)
4 if Intersection(I′′, Iˆh) 6= ∅ then
5 for I ′′ ∈ Intersection(I′′, Iˆh) do
6 rhI′′ ← GetRegretsFor(I ′′, rh)
7 γI′′ ← set of indices of {a ∈ A(I ′′)|rhI′′ [a] ∈[
maxa′∈A(I′′)
(
rhI′′ [a
′]− 1
5
√
t
,maxa′∈A(I′′) r
h
I′′ [a
′]
)]
}
8 Split I′′ to subsets I′′1 , ..., I′′k
9 Each I′′j ∈ {I′′1 , ..., I′′k } contains all the I ′′ ∈ I′′ with the same γI′′
10 I′′max ← arg maxI′′j ∈{I′′1 ,...,I′′k } |I
′′
j |
11 I′′f ← I′′max ∪ I′′ \ Iˆh
12 Gt.I ← Gt.I \ I
13 r ← r\ GetRegretsFor(I, r)
14 for I′′j ∈
({I′′1 , ..., I′′k } ∪ I′′f ) \ I′′max do
15 Inew ← CreateNewIS(I′′j )
16 Gt.I ← Gt.I ∪ Inew
17 rInew ← InitRegret(Inew)
18 r ← r ∪ rInew
19 if GetPlayer(t) = 1 then
20 b¯1 ← b¯1\ GetStrategyFor(I, b¯1)
21 else
22 b¯2 ← b¯2\ GetStrategyFor(I, b¯2)
23 return Gt
In this section, we focus on the description of the heuristic update of the
abstraction.
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Let i be the player who’s regrets are updated in iteration t. As a part of
the abstraction update, the algorithm samples Iˆh ⊆ Ii of information sets of G
in t. Iˆh is sampled on line 7 in Algorithm 6 according to Algorithm 8. In this
case, the sampling in Algorithm 8 is done so that ∀I ∈ Iˆh Φt(I) ∈ I˜ti and
|Iˆh| = min
kh,∑
I∈I˜ti
|Φ−1t (I)|
 .
I.e., the size of Iˆh is limited by the parameter kh and the actual number of
information sets in Ii that are still mapped to some abstracted information set
in iteration t. Additionally, sampling of information sets on line 6 in Algorithm
8 is performed so that the probability of adding any I ∈ I such that Φt(I) ∈ I˜t
to Iˆh is equal to
1∑
I′∈I˜i |Φ
−1
t (I
′)| . (18)
The algorithm keeps track of the regrets rh in each I ∈ Iˆh during the CFR+
update in iteration t (lines 22 to 25 in Algorithm 7).
The actual abstraction update is done in a following way (Algorithm 10).
The algorithm iterates over I ∈ I˜ti in Gt which contain some of the I ′ ∈ Iˆh
(lines 2 and 4). For all I ′′ ∈ Φ−1t (I) ∩ Iˆh it creates a set of action indices
γI′′ corresponding to actions with regret in rh at most
1
5
√
t
distant from the
maximum regret for I ′′ in rh (line 7). The abstraction update then splits the
set Φ−1t (I)∩Iˆh to largest subsets I ′′1 , ..., I ′′k such that ∀I ′′j ∈ {I ′′1 , ..., I ′′k }∀I ′′1 , I ′′2 ∈
I ′′j γI′′1 = γI′′1 (lines 8 to 9). Next, the algorithm selects I ′′max, the largest element
of {I ′′1 , ..., I ′′k } (line 10) and adds all the I ′′ ∈ Φ−1t (I) which are not in Iˆh toI ′′max, creating I ′′f (line 11). This is done to avoid unnecessary split caused by
not tracking regrets in Φ−1t (I)\Iˆh. Finally, the abstracted set I is replaced in Gt
by the set of new information sets Itn created from
(
{I ′′1 , ..., I ′′k } ∪ I ′′f
)
\ I ′′max.
The regrets in each In ∈ Itn are set to 0 in r and the average strategies are
discarded (lines 12 to 22). Finally, let T be an iteration such that T > t.
Assuming that In ∈ Itn was not split further during iterations {t+ 1, ..., T}, the
average strategy in In is computed ∀a ∈ A(In) as
b¯Ti (I, a) =

1
|A(I)| , if T = t+ 1,
2
∑T
t′=t+1 t
′·pib
t′
i
i (I)·bt
′
i (I,a)
((T−t−1)2+T−t−1)
∑T
t′=t+1 pi
bt
′
i
i (I)
, otherwise.
(19)
The average strategy update in eq. (19) corresponds to the average strategy
update described in Section 3.4, i.e., it does a weighted average of the bti strate-
gies over iterations {t+ 1, ..., T} with weight corresponding to the iteration.
4.3.3. Theoretical Properties
In this section we present the bound on the average extrenal regret of the
CFR+IRA algorithm. We first derive the bound for the case where the algo-
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rithm uses only the regret bound abstraction update described in Section 4.3.1.
Since CFR+IRA randomly samples information sets during the abstraction up-
date, we provide a probabilistic bound on the average external regret of the
algorithm. We then show that the regret bound still holds when also using
the heuristic update described in Section 4.3.2. Finally, we discuss why it is
insufficient to use only the heuristic abstraction update.
Given iteration T , let T T = (T1, ..., Tk) be a subsequence of T such that Tk
is the largest element in T for which Tk < T . τT is the sequence of iteration
counts corresponding to T T . Let τT
R¯i
be a sequence containing all the iteration
counts τj ∈ τT , where for the corresponding Tj , Tj+1 holds that
L
Tj
I (Tj+1) <
R¯i
|Ii| , ∀I ∈ Ii, (20)
for a given regret R¯i. Next, we define pr(T, R¯i), as
pr(T, R¯i) =

0, if |τTR¯i | < |I|,
1−
(
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I|)(|τTR¯i ||I| )
, otherwise.
(21)
Lemma 2. pr(T, R¯i) is the lower bound on the probability, that the abstraction
in iteration T allows representation of average strategy with average external
regret R¯i for player i.
Proof. pr is computed for the worst case where all the I ∈ I are in some ab-
stracted information set in G1, and where it is necessary to reconstruct the
complete original game by removing all I ∈ I from their abstracted information
sets one by one in a fixed order to allow representation of the average strategy
with average external regret R¯i for player i. The rest of the proof is conducted
in the following way: First, we show that the iteration counts in τT
R¯i
are large
enough to guarantee that if there is an abstracted information set preventing
representation of average strategies with average external regret bellow R¯i, it
will be split. We then provide the probability that the information set struc-
ture in a given iteration allows CFR+IRA to compute strategies with average
external regret R¯i for player i as a function of the number of iteration counts
in τT
R¯i
.
We know that
R¯Ti ≤
∑
I∈Ii
(
RTi,imm(I)
)+
≤ |Ii|max
I∈Ii
(
RTi,imm(I)
)+
, ∀T. (22)
Lets assume that the information set structure of the current abstraction GT
in iteration T does not allow representation of average strategy with average
external regret R¯i and that we do not update G
T any further. Then, from eq.
(22), there must exist I ∈ Ii such that for each iterations T ′, T ′′, T ′′ > T ′(
RT
′′
T ′,imm(I)
)+
>
R¯i
|Ii| . (23)
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To remove an information set I from its abstracted information set as a
part of the regret bound abstraction update during the sequence of iterations
(Tj , ..., Tj+1), there must exists T
′ ∈ (Tj , ..., Tj+1) such that RT ′Tj ,imm(I) >
L
Tj
I (T
′). Therefore, from eq. (23) follows, that to guarantee that I preventing
convergence is removed from its abstracted information set during (Tj , ..., Tj+1),
it needs to hold that L
Tj
I (Tj+1) <
R¯i
|Ii| . Hence, from eq. (20) in definition of
τT
R¯i
follows that τT
R¯i
contains only the iteration counts that guarantee that such
information set is removed from its abstracted information set.
Now we turn to the formula in eq. (21). The first case of the piecewise
function in eq. (21) handles the situation where there are not enough iteration
counts τj ∈ τTR¯i large enough to guarantee the required |I| splits. The second
case computes the probability that given |τT
R¯i
| samples we correctly sample
the required sequence of the length |I|. The second case has the following
intuition.
(|τT
R¯i
|
|I|
)
is the number of possibilities how to choose a subsequence
of the length |I| from a sequence of length |τT
R¯i
|.
(
kb
|I|
)|I|
is the probability
that a specific sequence of all information sets, i.e., a sequence of length |I|,
is sampled when we sample kb from |I| elements with a uniform probability.
Hence,
(
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I|)(|τTR¯i ||I| )
is the probability that the sequence of length |I|
is not sampled in
(|τT
R¯i
|
|I|
)
attempts.
Since pr(T, R¯i) is computed assuming that there is the worst case number of
splits necessary and that it takes the maximum possible number of iterations to
split each information set, it is a lower bound on the actual probability that the
abstraction in iteration T allows representation of average strategy with average
external regret R¯i for player i.
Lemma 3. The average external regret of the CFR+IRA is bounded in the
following way
RTi
T
≤ Bi(T ) = 1
T
(
∆|Ii|
√
Amax
√
T + ∆|Ii|Tlim
)
, (24)
with probability at least pr(Tlim, Bi(T )).
Proof. Bi(T ) decomposes the bound on the average external regret to two parts.
First, in iterations {1, ..., Tlim} it assumes that the structure of the abstrac-
tion prevents the algorithm from convergence. Second, it assumes that the
abstraction is updated so that it allows convergence of CFR+ in iterations
{Tlim + 1, ..., T}. Hence, the regret in all I ∈ Ii has the following property:
max
a∈A(I)
RTi (I, a) ≤ ∆Tlim + ∆
√
|A(I)|
√
T . (25)
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This bound holds since ∆
√|A(I)|√T is the bound on maxa∈A(I)RTi (I, a)
in I provided by regret matching+. Additionally, since the regret matching+
in I in each t ∈ {1, ..., Tlim} uses regrets computed for information set φt(I)
and not directly for I, it can lead to arbitrarily bad outcomes with respect to
the utility structure of the solved game (as we assume that the structure of
the abstraction prevents convergence of the algorithm in these iterations). The
∆Tlim corresponds to the worst case regret that can be accumulated for each
action in I during the first Tlim iterations. From eqs. (25) and (4) follows that
RTi
T
≤ Bi(T ) = 1
T
(
∆|Ii|
√
Amax
√
T + ∆|Ii|Tlim
)
.
Since we assume that the abstraction in iteration Tlim of CFR+IRA al-
lows computing the regret Bi(T ), this bound holds with probability at least
pr(Tlim, Bi(T )) (Lemma 2).
Finally, we provide the bound on the external regret of CFR+IRA as a
function of the probability that the bound holds.
Theorem 2. Let
α(δ) =
3
√
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I| (δ)+|I|+3
Amax. (26)
In each T ≥ (α(δ)+1)3, the average external regret of CFR+IRA is bounded
in the follwing way
RTi
T
≤ ∆|Ii|
√
Amax√
T
+ ∆|Ii|α(δ)3√T + ∆|Ii|
1
T
∈ O
(
1
3
√
T
)
. (27)
with probability 1− δ.
Proof. The bound in eq. (27) is created by substituting
Tlim =
⌈
3
√
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I| (δ)+|I|+3
Amax · T 23
⌉
, (28)
to the bound from Lemma 3. Hence, we need to show that choosing this
Tlim guarantees that
pr(Tlim, Bi(T )) ≥ 1− δ. (29)
The proof is conducted in the following way. First, in Lemma 4 we show the
size of τTlimBi(T ) sufficient to guarantee that inequality (29) holds. In Lemma 5 we
derive the lower bound TBi(T ) on each element of τ
Tlim
Bi(T )
. TBi(T ) is the number
of iterations sufficient to guarantee that some information set preventing the
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abstraction from allowing representation of average strategy with average ex-
ternal regret Bi(T ) is split during the regret bound abstraction update. Finally,
in Lemma 6 we derive the Tlim that implies sufficient number of elements in
τTlimBi(T ).
Lemma 4.
|τTlimBi(T )| > |I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) + |I| (30)
guarantees that pr(Tlim, Bi(T )) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof.
|τTlimBi(T )| > |I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) + |I| (31)
=⇒
(
|τTlimBi(T )| − |I|
)|I|
> |I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) (32)
=⇒
|τTlim
Bi(T )
|∏
j=|τTlim
Bi(T )
|−|I|+1
j > |I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) (33)
=⇒
∏|τTlimBi(T )|
j=|τTlim
Bi(T )
|−|I|+1
j
|I|! > log1−( kbI )|I|(δ) (34)
=⇒
|τTlimBi(T )|!
(|τTlimBi(T )| − |I|)!|I|!
> log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) (35)
=⇒
(
|τTlimBi(T )|
|I|
)
> log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) (36)
=⇒
(
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|)(|τTlimBi(T )||I| )
< δ (37)
=⇒ 1−
(
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|)(|τTlimBi(T )||I| )
> 1− δ (38)
Lemma 5.
TBi(T ) =
⌈[
T
√
Amax
Tlim +
√
Amax
√
T
]2⌉
is a sufficient number of iterations to guarantee that the regret bound abstrac-
tion update splits some information set preventing the abstraction from allowing
representation of average strategy with average external regret Bi(T ).
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Proof. The regret bound abstraction update removes an information set I ∈ I
from its abstracted information set during the sequence of iterations (Tj , ..., Tj+1),
when there exists T ′ ∈ (Tj , ..., Tj+1) such that RT ′Tj ,imm(I) > L
Tj
I (T
′). As di-
cussed in the proof of Lemma 2, to guarantee that I is removed from its ab-
stracted information set if it prevents the regret bellow Bi(T ), we need to make
sure that
L
Tj
I (Tj+1) <
Bi(T )
|Ii| . (39)
Since
L
Tj
I (T
′) ≤ ∆I
√|A(I)|√
T ′ − Tj
, ∀T ′ ∈ {Tj + 1, ..., Tj+1}, ∀I ∈ Ii,
it follows that
max
I∈Ii
L
Tj
I (Tj+1) ≤
∆
√
Amax√
Tj+1 − Tj
. (40)
And so from eqs. (39) and (40), it is sufficient for TBi(T ) to satisfy
∆
√
Amax√
TBi(T )
<
Bi(T )
|Ii| .
Smallest TBi(T ) satisfying this inequality is
TBi(T ) =
⌈[
T
√
Amax
Tlim +
√
Amax
√
T
]2⌉
. (41)
Hence, all elements in τTlimBi(T ) must be greater or equal to TBi(T ) to make sure
that the structure of the abstraction in iteration Tlim allows representation of
average strategy with average external regret Bi(T ) for player i with sufficient
probability.
The number of elements in τTlim is at least log2(Tlim + 1) − 1, since ∀j ∈
{1, ..., |τTlim |} τj = 2j−1. From Lemma 4 we know that we need the last⌈
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) + |I|
⌉
elements of τTlim (which form τTlimBi(T )) to be higher or equall to TBi(T ).
Lemma 6. When using
Tlim =
⌈
3
√
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I| (δ)+|I|+3
Amax · T 23
⌉
,
the last
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⌈
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) + |I|
⌉
elements in τTlim are higher or equal to TBi(T ).
Proof.
Tlim =
⌈
3
√
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I| (δ)+|I|+3
Amax · T 23
⌉
(42)
=⇒ Tlim ≥
3
√
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
|I|
)|I| (δ)+|I|+3
Amax · T 23 (43)
=⇒ T 3lim ≥ 2 · 2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kbI
)|I|+1 (δ)+|I|+2
AmaxT
2 (44)
=⇒ (Tlim + 1)
(
Tlim +
√
Amax
√
T
)2
≥ (45)
≥ 2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kbI
)|I| (δ)+|I|+2
2AmaxT
2 (46)
=⇒ Tlim + 1
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kbI
)|I| (δ)+|I|+2 ≥
2AmaxT
2(
Tlim +
√
Amax
√
T
)2 (47)
=⇒ Tlim + 1
2
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kbI
)|I| (δ)+|I|+2 ≥

AmaxT
2(
Tlim +
√
Amax
√
T
)2
 (48)
=⇒ 2
log2(Tlim+1)−2− |I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kbI
)|I| (δ)−|I|
≥ TBi(T ) (49)
=⇒ 2
log2(Tlim+1)−1−
 |I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kbI
)|I| (δ)+|I|
 ≥ TBi(T ) (50)
Eq. (50) states that last⌈
|I|
√
|I|! log
1−
(
kb
I
)|I|(δ) + |I|
⌉
elements of τTlim are at least TBi(T ), since the elements in τ
Tlim are increas-
ing.
Hence, using Tlim from Lemma 6 guarantees that pr(Tlim, Bi(T )) > 1 − δ
from Lemma 4. When substituting this Tlim to the bound from Lemma 3, i.e.,
to
RTi
T
≤ 1
T
(
∆|Ii|
√
Amax
√
T + ∆|Ii|Tlim
)
, (51)
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Table 1: Expected utilities after actions in I′ and I′′
I ′ I ′′
c 0 0
d 1 10
I ′ I ′′
c 10 1
d 0 0
we get
RTi
T
≤ 1
T
(
∆|Ii|
√
Amax
√
T + ∆|Ii|
⌈
α(δ)T
2
3
⌉)
(52)
≤ ∆|Ii|
√
Amax√
T
+ ∆|Ii|α(δ)3√T + ∆|Ii|
1
T
(53)
∈ O
(
1
3
√
T
)
. (54)
Finally, we need to show that using T ≥ (α(δ)+1)3 guarantees that T ≥ Tlim:
T ≥ (α(δ) + 1)3 (55)
=⇒ 3
√
T ≥ (α(δ) + 1) (56)
=⇒ T ≥ (α(δ) + 1)T 23 (57)
=⇒ T ≥
⌈
α(δ)T
2
3
⌉
(58)
=⇒ T ≥ Tlim. (59)
Combining Regret Bound and Heuristic Abstraction Update.
When using the heuristic abstraction update in combination with the regret
bound update, Theorem 2 still holds, since in the worst case the heuristic up-
date does not perform any splits and all the information set splits need to be
performed by the regret bound update. Adding the heuristic abstraction update
can only reduce the number of iterations needed by the algorithm.
Counterexample for Heuristic Abstraction Update.
Here we show the intuition why using only the heuristic abstraction update
does not guarantee convergence of CFR+IRA to the NE of the solved game G.
Let I be an information set in Gt such that φ−1t (I) = {I ′, I ′′}. Let At(I) =
{c, d} and A(I ′) = {x, y}, A(I ′′) = {v, w}. Lets assume that the expected values
for actions c and d in I ′ and I ′′ oscilate between values depicted in Table 1 (left)
and (right). Hence, when computing the regret rh
Iˆ
(a) = vi(b
t
Iˆ→a, Iˆ)−vi(bt, Iˆ) for
Iˆ ∈ {I ′, I ′′} and a ∈ A(Iˆ) during the heuristic abstraction update in iteration t
where the expected utilities from Table 1(left) occur, we get
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rhI′(c) = −bti(I, d) (60)
rhI′(d) = 1− bti(I, d) (61)
rhI′′(c) = −10bti(I, d) (62)
rhI′′(d) = 10− 10bti(I, d). (63)
When computing the regret rh for heuristic update in iteration t′ where the
expected utilities from Table 1 (right) occur, we get
rhI′(c) = 10− 10bt
′
i (I, c) (64)
rhI′(d) = −10bt
′
i (I, c) (65)
rhI′′(c) = 1− bt
′
i (I, c) (66)
rhI′′(d) = −bt
′
i (I, c). (67)
The actions corresponding to d are always prefered in both I ′ and I ′′ when
the utilties are given by Table 1 (left) by the same margin as the actions corre-
sponding to c are always prefer in both I ′ and I ′′ when the utilties are given by
Table 1 (right). Hence, γI′ = γI′′ (i.e., the inidices of actions with the largest
regret are always equal) in all iterations t′′ for any bt
′′
i . Therefore, I is never
split during the heuristic update. However, CFR+IRA in I converges to a uni-
form startegy with the average expected value 2.75 in both I ′ and I ′′ since the
regret updates lead to equal regrets for both c and d, while CFR+ converges
to strategy bi(I
′, x) = 1 and bi(I ′′, w) = 1 with the average expected value 5 in
both I ′ and I ′′.
4.3.4. Storing the Information Set Map
In this section we discuss the details of storing the mapping of information
sets I of G to It of Gt in CFR+IRA.
Initial Abstraction Storage. The initial abstraction is identical to the
initial abstraction used by FPIRA, hence the mapping is stored without using
any additional memory as described in Section 4.2.4.
Regret Bound Update. The regret bound update resulting in Gt only
removes information sets from G from the abstracted information sets in Gt−1.
Hence similarly to Section 4.2.4 Case 2, we use the mapping used in Gt−1 in
all information sets of G mapped to abstracted information sets in Gt, and the
information set structure provided by the domain description in the rest. There-
fore, no additional memory is needed to store the mapping for Gt compared to
the mapping required in Gt−1.
Heuristic Update. The heuristic update resulting in Gt, can split existing
abstracted information set I in Gt−1 to a set of information sets I ′ such that
some I ′ ∈ I ′ are still abstracted information sets. Hence in this case we need
to store the new mapping as described in Section 4.2.4 Case 1.
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4.3.5. Memory and Time Efficiency
The CFR+ requires storing the regret and average strategy for each I ∈ I
and a ∈ A(I) in G. Hence, when storing the regrets and average strategy in
Gt in iteration t in CFR+IRA, the algorithm achieves memory savings directly
proportional to the reduction in the number of information sets in Gt compared
to the number of information sets in G. Additional memory used to store the
current abstraction mapping is discussed in Section 4.3.4. Finally, CFR+IRA
stores additional regrets in kb + kh information sets of G in every iteration for
the purposes of the abstraction update. Since kb and kh are parameters of the
CFR+IRA, this memory can be adjusted as necessary. In Section 5 we empir-
ically demonstrate that memory used to store the information set mapping is
small and so it does not substantially affect the memory efficiency of CFR+IRA.
Additionally, we show how the different kh and kb affect the convergence of
CFR+IRA.
The iteration of CFR+IRA consists of a tree traversal in function ComputeRegrets
(Algorithm 7) and the two updates of the abstraction. The update of regrets r
as a part of ComputeRegrets takes the same time as standard CFR+ iteration
applied to G. Additionally, in ComputeRegrets, CFR+IRA updates rh and rb.
Since there is no additional tree traversal neccessary to obtain the values for
the update of rh and rb, the update takes time proportional to the number of
states in Iˆb ∪ Iˆh. In the worst case, the abstraction updates take time propor-
tional to |I|. In Section 5 we provide experimental evaluation of the runtime of
CFR+IRA.
5. Experiments
In this section we present the experimental evaluation of FPIRA and CFR+IRA.
First, we briefly describe the Double Oracle algorithm (DOEFG) [27] which will
be used as a baseline in the experiments and introduce domains used for the
experimental evaluation. Next, we demonstrate the convergence of CFR+IRA
compared to CFR+ and explain our choice of values of the kh and kb parameters
in the rest of the experimantal evaluation (these parameters control the mem-
ory used by CFR+IRA to update the abstraction, see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
for more details). We follow with the comparison of the memory requirements
of FPIRA, CFR+IRA and the DOEFG as a function of the exploitability of
the resulting strategies. Finally, we provide the comparison of the runtime of
FPIRA, CFR+IRA, and DOEFG. When reporting the results for CFR+IRA,
BxHyCFR+IRA stands for CFR+IRA where kb = x and kh = y.
5.1. Experimental Settings
The experiments were performed using domain independent implementa-
tion of all algorithms in Java2. DOEFG uses IBM CPLEX 12.6. to solve the
2The implementation is available at http://jones.felk.cvut.cz/repo/gtlibrary. CFR+IRA
and FPIRA are available in package /src/cz/agents/gtlibrary/experimental/imperfectrecall/
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underlying linear programs. Both FPIRA and CFR+IRA used the initial ab-
straction built as described in Section 4.1.1. Both CFR+ and CFR+IRA used
the delay of 100 iterations during the average strategy update, i.e., the average
strategies are not computed for the first 100 iterations, and the average strate-
gies in iteration T > 100 are computed only from current strategies in iterations
{101, ..., T}. And finally, the LTjI functions in CFR+IRA, used during the regret
bound update (see Section 4.3.1), were set to
L
Tj
I (T
′) =
∆I
√A(I)
100
√
T ′
, ∀I ∈ I,∀Tj , Tj+1, ∀T ′ ∈ {Tj + 1, ..., Tj+1}.
5.2. Double Oracle Algorithm
The Double oracle algorithm for solving perfect recall EFGs (DOEFG, [43])
is an adaptation of column/constraint generation techniques for EFGs. The
main idea of DOEFG is to create a restricted game where only a subset of
actions is allowed to be played by players. The algorithm then incrementally
expands this restricted game by allowing new actions. The restricted game is
solved as a standard zero-sum extensive-form game using the sequence-form
LP. The expansion of the restricted game is performed using best response
algorithms that search the original unrestricted game to find new sequences to
add to the restricted game for each player. The algorithm terminates when the
best response calculated in the unrestricted game provides no improvement to
the solution of the restricted game for either of the players.
DOEFG uses two main ideas: (1) the algorithm assumes that players play
some pure default strategy outside of the restricted game (e.g., playing the first
action in each information set given some ordering), (2) temporary utility values
are assigned to leaves in the restricted game that correspond to inner nodes in
the original unrestricted game (so-called temporary leaves), which form an upper
bound on the expected utility.
We chose the DOEFG as a baseline for comparison since it is the state-of-
the-art domain-independent algorithm for solving large EFGs with prohibitive
memory requirements. Furthermore, the conceptual idea of DOEFG is similar
to FPIRA and CFR+IRA since DOEFG also creates a smaller version of the
original game and repeatedly refines it until the desired approximation of the
Nash equilibrium of the original game is found. Our algorithms, however, exploit
a completely different type of sparseness than DOEFG.
5.3. Domains
Here we introduce the zero-sum domains used in the experimental evalua-
tion. These domains were chosen for their diverse structure both in the utility
and the source of imperfect information. The players perfectly observe the
actions of their opponent in poker, only the actions of the chance player at
automatedabstractions/memeff.
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the start of the game (corresponding to card deal) are hidden. In II-Goofspiel
and Graph pursuit, on the other hand, the imperfect information is created
by partial observability of the moves of the opponent through the whole game.
Furthermore, in II-Goofspiel and poker, the utility of players cumulates during
the playthrough (the chips and the value of the cards won), while in Graph
pursuit the utility depends solely on whether the attacker is intercepted or not
or whether he reaches his goal.
5.3.1. Poker
As a first domain, we use a two-player poker, which is commonly used as a
benchmark in imperfect-information game solving [1]. We use a version of poker
with a deck of cards with 4 card types 3 cards per type. There are two rounds.
In the first round, each player places an ante of 1 chip in the pot and receives
a single private card. A round of betting follows. Every player can bet from a
limited set of allowed values or check. After a bet, the other player can raise,
again choosing the value from a limited set, call or forfeit the game by folding.
The number of consecutive raises is limited. A shared card is dealt after one
of the players calls or after both players check. Another round of betting takes
place with identical rules. The player with the highest pair wins. If none of the
players has a pair, the player with the highest card wins. We create different
poker domains by varying the number of bets b, the number of raises r and the
number of consecutive raises allowed c. We refer to these instances as Pbrc, e.g.,
P234 stand for a poker which uses two possible values of bets, 3 values of raises
and allows 4 consecutive raises.
5.3.2. II-Goofspiel
II-Goofspiel is a modification of the Goofspiel game [44] which is commonly
used as a benchmark domain (see, e.g., [45, 46]). Similarly to Goofspiel, II-
Goofspiel is a card game with three identical packs of cards, two for players and
one randomly shuffled and placed in the middle. In our variant, both players
know the order of the cards in the middle pack. The game proceeds in rounds.
Every round starts by revealing the top card of the middle pack. Both players
proceed to simultaneously bet on this card using their own cards. The cards
used to bet are discarded, and the player with the higher value of the card used
to bet wins the middle card. After the end of the game, each player gets utility
equal to the difference between the points collected by him and the number of
points collected by his opponent. The players do not observe the bet of their
opponent. Instead, they learn whether they have won, lost, or if there was a tie
caused by both players using cards with equal value. We change the number of
cards in all 3 decks, by GSx, we refer to the II-Goofspiel where each deck has x
cards.
5.3.3. Graph Pursuit
Graph pursuit is a game played between the defender and the attacker on
the graph depicted in Figure 4. The attacker starts in the node labeled S and
tries to reach the node labeled G. The defender controls two units which start
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Figure 4: Graph used in the Graph pursuit domain.
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Figure 5: The plots showing the sum of exploitabilities of the resulting strategies for player 1
and 2 (log y-axis) as a function of iterations (x-axis) for GP5, GS5, P222.
in nodes D1 and D2. The players move simultaneously and are forced to move
their units each round. Both the attacker and defender only observe the content
of the nodes with distance less or equal to 2 from the current node occupied by
any of their units. The attacker gets utility 2 for reaching the goal G. If the
attacker is caught by crossing the same edge as any of the units of the defender
or by moving to a node occupied by the defender he obtains the utility -1 and
the game ends. If a given number of moves occurs without any of the previous
events, the game is a tie, and both players get 0. We create different versions
of Graph pursuit by changing the limit on the number of moves. By GPx we
denote Graph pursuit where there are x moves of each player allowed.
5.4. Convergence of CFR+IRA
In this section, we provide the experiments showing the convergence of
CFR+IRA with varying kh and kb parameters compared to CFR+ applied di-
rectly to the unabstracted game. Additionally, we justify our choice of values
of the kh and kb parameters in the rest of the experimental evaluation.
In Figure 5 we present the sum of exploitabilities of the resulting strategies
of player 1 and 2 computed by CFR+IRA with various settings compared to
CFR+ for GP5, GS5, and P222 as a function of the number of iterations. We
depict the results for CFR+IRA as averages and standard error over 10 runs
of the algorithm (the standard error is usually too small to be visible). Each
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Figure 6: The plots showing the sum of exploitabilities of the resulting strategies of player 1
and 2 (log y-axis) as a function of iterations (x-axis) for GP6, GS6, P224.
run uses a different seed to randomly sample the information sets for regret
bound and heuristic abstraction updates. We show 3 settings of CFR+IRA
where kh + kb = 100 and 3 settings where kh + kb = 1000. The convergence
of CFR+IRA with kh = 0 is significantly worse compared to the rest of the
settings across all domains even when we increase kh+kb from 100 to 1000. For
this reason, we focus only on settings where kh > 0 in the following experimen-
tal evaluation. In GP5 and GS5 all CFR+IRA parametrizations with kh > 0
converge similarly to CFR+. Note that CFR+IRA can converge faster than
CFR+ since the final abstracted game which allows convergence can have sig-
nificantly less information sets and hence tighter bound on the average external
regret. On the other hand, in P222 CFR+ converges faster than CFR+IRA.
Additionally, there is very little difference between the convergence speed of the
different settings of CFR+IRA where kh > 0.
In Figure 6 we show the same results for GP6, GS6 and P224. The plots show
slower convergence of CFR+IRA with kh+kb = 100 compared to kh+kb = 1000.
Additionally, except for GP6, all versions of CFR+IRA converge slower than the
CFR+. This is expected, since using kh + kb = 100 and kh + kb = 1000 means
that the algorithm uses less than 0.1% and 1% of information sets for abstraction
update in all 3 domains. Hence it takes longer to refine the abstraction to allow
strategies with a smaller exploitability.
The results above suggest that all the evaluated settings of CFR+IRA with
fixed kh +kb and kh > 0 perform similarly. Additionally, we have observed that
this similarity also holds for the memory required by CFR+IRA. On the other
hand, increasing the sum of kh + kb from 100 to 1000 improved the convergence
speed of CFR+IRA in the larger domains. Hence, for clarity, in the following ex-
periments we report only two settings of CFR+IRA, namely B10H90CFR+IRA
and B100H900CFR+IRA.
5.5. Memory Requirements of Algorithms
In this section, we discuss the memory requirements of FPIRA, CFR+IRA,
and DOEFG as a function of the exploitability of the resulting strategies on 2
sets of domains: GP5, GS5, P222 with approx. 104 information sets and GP6,
GS6, P224 with approx. 105 information sets. Since the actual memory usage
is implementation dependent, we analyze the size of the abstractions built by
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Figure 7: The plots depicting the number of information sets (log y-axis) used by algorithms
to compute strategies with the exploitability depicted on the log x-axis for GP5, GS5, P222.
CFR+IRA and FPIRA and the size of the rest of the data structures required
by these algorithms. We compare these results with the size of the restricted
game built by DOEFG and other data structures stored by this algorithm.
Next, we compare the number of 32-bit words stored during the run of FPIRA,
CFR+IRA, and DOEFG. We conclude this section by more detailed analysis of
the scalability of CFR+IRA in the poker domain and compare this scalability
with DOEFG and FPIRA.
5.5.1. GP5, GS5 and P222
In Figure 7 we show the number of information sets in the abstraction (or re-
stricted game) built by the algorithms as a function of the sum of exploitabilities
of the resulting strategies of player 1 and 2 for GP5, GS5, and P222. We re-
port these results for DOEFG, FPIRA and two settings of CFR+IRA. The lines
for CFR+IRA depict the average number of information sets over 10 runs of
CFR+IRA. Each run uses a different seed to randomly sample the information
sets for regret bound and heuristic abstraction updates. Note that the standard
error is too small to be visible in these plots. FPIRA and DOEFG require a
similar number of information sets to reach strategies with equal exploitabil-
ity. The CFR+IRA, on the other hand, requires significantly less information
sets than FPIRA and DOEFG for these domains. For exploitability 0.05, the
B10H90CFR+IRA uses on average 9.5%, 3.1%, 14.9% of information sets of the
total information set count of GP5, GS5 and P222 respectivelly, while FPIRA
uses 19.6%, 15.6%, 42.9% and DOEFG 24.0%, 17.2%, 47.8%.
In Figure 8 we show the size of data structures stored during the run of
FPIRA, CFR+IRA, and DOEFG for GP5, GS5, and P222.
FPIRA: The results for FPIRA are presented in the plots in the first row
of the Figure. We report the number of information sets of the abstraction, the
size of the information set mapping, the size of the cache used during the best
response computation, the size of the best response and the size of the cache
used during the ∆ computation as a function of the sum of exploitabilities
of the resulting strategies of player 1 and 2. Note that the cache sizes and
best response strategy size are reported as the maximum size encountered until
FPIRA reached strategies with the corresponding exploitability. The results
show that the size of the abstraction mapping remains small. On the other hand,
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Figure 8: Plots showing size of data stored during the run of FPIRA in the first row, CFR+IRA
in the second row and DOEFG in the third row (log y-axis) as a function of the sum of
exploitabilities of the resulting strategies of player 1 and 2 (log x-axis) for GP5, GS5 and
P222.
the cache used during the best response computation and the ∆ computation
can require prohibitive memory when applied to large games (the cache stores
value for each state encountered during the best response computation, and
hence its size can be significantly larger than the number of information sets).
For example, for exploitability 0.05 the size of the information set mapping was
20.5%, 18.2%, 43.4% of the total information set count of GP5, GS5, and P222,
while the size of the cache in the best response computation was 109.6%, 23.8%,
106.1%.
CFR+IRA: The plots in the second row show that both the average map-
ping size and the average number of information sets in the abstraction in
CFR+IRA remain small: B10H90CFR+IRA stored the mapping on average
only for 10.7%, 3.9%, 22.1% of the total information sets for GP5, GS5, and
P222 respectively. Additionally, in case of GP5, GS5 and P222 kh + kb =
100 corresponds to storing regrets required for the abstraction update only in
1.1%, 1.0%, 0.7% of informations sets of the whole game respectivelly.
DOEFG: Finally in the third row we show the data structures required by
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Figure 9: The number of 32 bit words the algorithms store (log y-axis) as a function of the
exploitability of the resulting strategies (log x-axis) for GP5, GS5 and P222.
the DOEFG. Similarly to FPIRA we report the maximum size of the cache used
in the best response and the maximum size of the best response strategy since
DOEFG uses the best response computation with the cache as oracle extending
the restricted game (see [27], Section 4.2). Additionally, we report the size of
the extended utility, which is required to construct the sequence-form LP for
the current restricted game. The extended utility stores one value for each
combination of sequences leading to some leaf or temporary leaf (see [27] for
more details). Finally, we report the number of information sets in the restricted
game. Note that it is not clear whether these are all the data required by the
DOEFG since DOEFG was never implemented or described with emphasis on
memory efficiency. However, we believe that these data form a necessary subset
of the data required by the DOEFG. The results show that storing the extended
utility requires prohibitive memory as its size can be significantly larger than
the number of information sets. For example, for exploitability 0.05 the size
of the extended utility was 297%, 102% and 352% of the total information set
count of GP5, GS5, and P222.
Finally, in Figure 9 we present the total number of 32-bit words (integers
and floats) the algorithms need to store in GP5, GS5, and P222 as a function of
the exploitability of the resulting strategies. These values were computed from
the data depicted in Figure 8. Furthermore, to properly reflect the data stored
by FPIRA in the abstraction, we replace the abstraction size by the number
of floats that are used to represent the average strategy stored in the current
abstraction. Similarly, for CFR+IRA we replace the average abstraction size
by the average number of floats that are required to represent the regrets and
average strategies stored in the current abstraction. These results show that
the number of words stored by FPIRA and DOEFG is comparable. On the
other hand, CFR+IRA in both settings requires an order of magnitude smaller
memory than FPIRA and DOEFG.
5.5.2. GP6, GS6 and P224
In Figure 10 we present the results showing the abstraction size for GP6, GS6
and P224. We depict the results for CFR+IRA as averages with the standard
error over 5 runs with different seeds (the standard error is again too small to
be visible). The CFR+IRA is capable of solving the games using abstractions
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Figure 10: The plots depicting the number of information sets (log y-axis) used by algorithms
to compute strategies with the sum of their exploitabilities depicted on the log x-axis for GP6,
GS6 and P224.
with significantly less information sets than the rest of the algorithms. For
exploitability of the resulting strategies 0.05, the B100H900CFR+IRA uses on
average 2.0%, 2.4%, 0.9% of information sets of GP6, GS6 and P224, while
DOEFG uses 13.3%, 12.0%, 4.0%. A slow runtime prevented FPIRA from
convergence to strategies with exploitability 0.05 in the given time (see Section
5.6 for runtime analysis). Additionally, in case of GP6, GS6 and P224, kh+kb =
100 corresponds to storing regrets required for the abstraction update only in
0.09%, 0.06%, 0.03% of informations sets of the whole game respectivelly.
In Figure 11 we present the size of data structures stored during the run
of CFR+IRA (first row) and DOEFG (second row) for GP6, GS6, and P224.
These results confirm that CFR+IRA requires small memory even in larger
domains, while the data stored by DOEFG remain large.
Finally, in Figure 12 we again depict the number of 32-bit words stored by
the algorithms for GP6, GS6, and P224. These results further confirm that
CFR+IRA requires at least an order of magnitude less memory than FPIRA
and DOEFG.
5.5.3. Relative Size of CFR+IRA Abstractions
Next, we compare how the size of the abstraction of the CFR+IRA scales
with the size of the solved domain. In Figure 13 we provide the relative size of
the abstraction required by CFR+IRA to compute strategies with exploitability
0.05 on P111, P222, and P224 as a function of the total information set count
of the solved domains. The relative sizes reported are computed with respect
to the total number of information set of the solved domains (left plot), the size
of the restricted game required by DOEFG (middle plot) and the size of the
abstraction required by FPIRA (right plot). The plots show that the relative
size of the abstraction required by CFR+IRA decreases in all 3 settings. This
suggests that for larger domains the relative size of the abstraction built by
CFR+IRA will further decrease not only compared to the total information set
count but also compared to the restricted game required by DOEFG and the
abstraction size required by FPIRA.
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Figure 11: Plots showing size of data stored during the run of CFR+IRA in the first row
and DOEFG in the second row (log y-axis) as a function of the sum of exploitabilities of the
resulting strategies of player 1 and 2 (log x-axis) for GP6, GS6 and P224.
FPIRA B10H90CFR+IRA B100H900CFR+IRA DOEFG
10 210 1100
Exploitability
102
103
104
105
siz
e
GP6
10 210 1100
Exploitability
102
103
104
105
siz
e
GS6
10 210 1100
Exploitability
102
103
104
105
siz
e
P224
Figure 12: The number of 32 bit words the algorithms store (log y-axis) as a function of the
exploitability of the resulting strategies (log x-axis) for GP6, GS6 and P224.
5.6. Runtime
In this section, we provide a comparison of the runtime of the algorithms.
The plots in Figure 14 show the runtime comparison in seconds of CFR+IRA,
FPIRA and CFR+ for GP5, GS5, and P222. We again depict the results for
CFR+IRA as averages with the standard error over 10 runs with different seeds.
The runtime of CFR+IRA in all version is consistently better than FPIRA and
except for P222 is comparable to the runtime of CFR+. We omitted the DOEFG
from this comparison since all CFR+IRA, FPIRA and CFR+ use a domain-
independent implementation in Java, while our implementation of DOEFG uses
efficient IBM CPLEX LP solver. Furthermore, as discussed above, DOEFG
was never implemented with emphasis on memory efficiency. And so it heavily
exploits additional caches for the restricted game not reported in the previous
section which significantly improve its runtime while increasing its memory re-
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Figure 13: Plots showing the relative size of the abstractions used by CFR+IRA (y-axis)
compared to the total information set count, the size of the restricted game used by DOEFG
and the size of the abstraction used by FPIRA to compute resulting strategies with the sum
of exploitabilities 0.05 as a function of the information set count of different poker instances
(log x-axis).
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Figure 14: The plots showing runtime of FPIRA and CFR+IRA in seconds (log y-axis)
required to reach the given sum of exploitabilities of resulting strategies of player 1 and 2 (log
x-axis) for GP5, GS5, and P222 respectively.
quirements. Hence, e.g., in case of GP5, the DOEFG took 19 seconds to find
strategies with exploitability 0.01, while B100H900CFR+IRA took 38 seconds
and the B10H90CFR+IRA 200 seconds. On the other hand, DOEFG required
1 GB of memory, while both settings of CFR+IRA used 38 MB.
The plots in Figure 15 show the runtime comparison in seconds of CFR+IRA,
FPIRA and CFR+ for GP6, GS6 and P224. These plots further confirm the
runtime dominance of CFR+IRA over FPIRA. The high runtime of FPIRA is
the cause for omitting the results of FPIRA for smaller exploitabilies of the
resulting strategies, as the time required to compute them becomes prohibitive.
Furthermore, the results show that the runtime is worse for CFR+IRA where
kb + kh = 100 compared to the case with kb + kh = 1000. Additionally, there
is a more profound difference between the CFR+IRA runtime and the run-
time of CFR+. Both observations are expected since using kh + kb = 100 and
kh + kb = 1000 means that the algorithm uses less than 0.1% and 1% of infor-
mation sets for the abstraction update in all 3 domains. Hence it takes longer
to refine the abstraction to allow strategies with a smaller exploitability.
5.7. Experiment Summary
We have shown that CFR+IRA requires at least an order of magnitude less
memory to find strategies with a given exploitability compared to the memory
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Figure 15: The plots showing runtime of FPIRA and CFR+IRA in seconds (log y-axis)
required to reach the given sum of exploitabilities of resulting strategies of player 1 and 2 (log
x-axis) for GP5, GS5 and P222 respectivelly.
required by FPIRA and DOEFG. Furthermore, the results suggest that when
increasing the size of the solved domains, the relative memory requirements of
CFR+IRA will further decrease not only compared to the total information set
count of the solved domain but also compared to the memory requirements of
FPIRA and DOEFG. Additionally, we have shown that the heuristic abstraction
update provides a good indication of the parts of the abstraction that need to be
updated and hence significantly enhances the convergence speed of CFR+IRA.
From the runtime perspective, the DOEFG is the most efficient algorithm.
However, we show that its good performance comes at the cost of high memory
requirements. Hence, CFR+IRA proves useful, as there are domains where the
memory requirements of DOEFG are too large.
6. Conclusion
The imperfect recall abstraction methodology can significantly reduce the
memory required to solve large extensive-form games. However, solving the re-
sulting imperfect recall abstracted game is a hard problem. Hence, there is only
a limited amount of work that focuses on using imperfect recall abstractions.
Previous works use either very restrictive subclasses of imperfect recall abstrac-
tions [19, 20, 21], heuristic approaches [22], or use computationally complex
algorithms to solve the imperfect recall abstracted game [23].
In this work, we take a novel approach to imperfect recall information ab-
stractions, which does not require any specific structure of the imperfect re-
call abstracted game nor does it use computationally complex algorithms to
solve it. Instead, we introduce two domain-independent algorithms FPIRA and
CFR+IRA which are able to start with an arbitrary imperfect recall abstrac-
tion of the solved two-player zero-sum perfect recall extensive-form game. The
algorithms simultaneously solve the abstracted game, detect the missing infor-
mation causing problems and return it to the players. This process is repeated
until provable convergence to the desired approximation of the Nash equilibrium
of the original game. As a consequence, the strategy from the abstracted game
can be used directly in the original game without the need to use translation
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techniques, and the quality of such strategy is not affected by the choice of the
initial abstraction.
The experimental evaluation shows that CFR+IRA requires at least an or-
der of magnitude less memory than FPIRA and the Double Oracle algorithm
(DOEFG, [27]) to solve given domains. Even when using trivial automatically
build initial imperfect recall abstraction, CFR+IRA is capable of closely ap-
proximating Nash equilibrium of large extensive-form games using abstraction
with as little as 0.9% of information sets of the original game. Furthermore, the
results suggest that the relative size of the abstraction used by CFR+IRA will
further decrease as the size of the solved game increases.
6.1. Future Work
There are several directions for future work.
Currently, we use a mapping of actions defined by the domain description
when merging the information sets as a part of the construction of the initial
abstraction for FPIRA and CFR+IRA. A more sophisticated mapping, which
would take into account the similarity of the actions, could greatly reduce the
number of refinements of the initial abstraction CFR+IRA and FPIRA need
to perform to find the desired approximation of the Nash equilibrium of the
original game.
CFR based approaches are known to perform extremely well in poker do-
mains [6, 37, 16]. Since as a part of CFR+IRA we use a domain-independent
implementation of CFR+, we were not able to reach the full performance poten-
tial of CFR+IRA. Hence, domain-specific implementation of CFR+IRA, even
outside of poker domain, would greatly improve its performance and would allow
further significant scale-up of the algorithm.
During the evaluation of CFR+IRA and FPIRA, we focused on automati-
cally built initial abstractions. We believe that applying CFR+IRA to existing
abstractions commonly used in poker would greatly improve the convergence
speed of CFR+IRA as these abstractions are built by domain experts and are
known to perform well in practice. Applying CFR+IRA to such abstractions
would have two benefits. (1) CFR+IRA could suggest further improvements of
the abstractions in places where they are too coarse. (2) CFR+IRA would use
these abstractions to provide a better approximation of the Nash equilibrium of
the original domain than the current solvers, as it would improve the abstrac-
tion if necessary. This, combined with the domain-specific implementation could
lead to significant improvement of the quality of the strategies computed in the
existing abstractions, as there are typically no guarantees that the abstraction
allows computation of sufficient approximation of the Nash equilibrium in the
poker domain.
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